Poland USA 2010: January 2008

Monday, January 28, 2008

Świetny film o Polsce , oby takich więcej.

Nice film. God bless Poland. For those who are abroad, you'll find no heaven there. Your country is heaven. Go back to Poland and follow your ancestors' work, respect and protect it as you should be. The most important is not yourself but your people.

Prof. Jerzy Robert Nowak – Historian, Writer, Publicist in Washington DC Wednesday, January 30, 2008 at 7:30 p.m.

Prof. Jerzy Robert Nowak – Historian, Writer, Publicist in Washington DC Wednesday, January 30, 2008 at 7:30 p.m.
"The Current Political Situation in Poland: Dangers and Potential"

Wednesday, January 30, 2008 at 7:30 p.m.

Parish Hall - Our Lady Queen of Poland
9700 Rosensteel Avenue, Silver Spring, MD

Professor Nowak is highly recognized for defending the truth about
Poland and Poland's history. He has vigorously countered numerous
attempts to falsify Polish history. Professor Nowak is the author of
over 40 books and more than 1500 articles.

Archbishop Josef Michalik, Chairman of the Polish Episcopal
Conference, is among those who have thanked Prof. Nowak for his work
to defend the truth about Poland.

(The presentation will be in Polish with translation into English.)

For information about Prof. Nowak (in Polish) see
www.jerzyrobertnowak.com
Prosze o kontakt jesli potrzebujecie dodatkowej informacji.

Alex Lech Bajan
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Wednesday, January 23, 2008

Break into the Enigma systems that were to be used by Nazi Germany was made in Poland in 1932

Break into the Enigma systems that were to be used by Nazi Germany was made in Poland in 1932
This article is about WW II intelligence material. For other uses, see Ultra (disambiguation). v · d · e The Enigma cipher machine

Ultra (sometimes capitalized ULTRA) was the name used by the British for intelligence resulting from decryption of German communications in World War II. The term eventually became the standard designation in both Britain and the United States for all intelligence from high-level cryptanalytic sources. The name arose because the code-breaking success was considered more important than the highest security classification available at the time (Most Secret) and so was regarded as being Ultra secret.

Much of the German cipher traffic was encrypted on the Enigma machine, hence the term "Ultra" has often been used almost synonymously with "Enigma decrypts."

Until the name "Ultra" was adopted, there were several cryptonyms for intelligence from this source, including Boniface. For some time thereafter, "Ultra" was used only for intelligence from this channel.

Later the Germans began to use several stream cipher teleprinter systems for their most important traffic, to which the British gave the generic code-name FISH. Several distinct systems were used, principally the Lorenz SZ 40/42 (initially code-named TUNNY) and Geheimfernschreiber (code-named STURGEON).

These also were broken, particularly TUNNY, which the British thoroughly penetrated. It was eventually attacked using the Colossus, considered to be the forerunner of the electronic programmable digital computer. Although the volume of messages read from this system was much smaller than that from the Enigma, they more than made up for it in their importance.

F.W. Winterbotham, in The Ultra Secret (1974), quotes the western Supreme Allied Commander, Dwight D. Eisenhower, as at war's end describing Ultra as having been "decisive" to Allied victory in World War II.

This article discusses how Enigma-derived intelligence was put to use. For a description of the machine itself, see Enigma machine. For the history and techniques of Enigma-breaking, see Cryptanalysis of the Enigma.

Contents
1 Sources and history
1.1 Encrypted messages
1.2 Breaking the cipher
1.2.1 Methods of cryptanalytic attack
2 Use of Ultra
3 Purple decrypts in Europe
4 Postwar public disclosure of Ultra
4.1 Difficulties with some disclosures
5 Ultra's strategic consequences
5.1 Wartime consequences
5.2 Postwar consequences
6 Consequences of Britain's policy of official secrecy
7 Further reading
8 References
9 External links

//

Sources and history

Encrypted messages
Ultra material largely came from German cipher traffic. These messages were generated on several variants of an electro-mechanical rotor machine called "Enigma." The Enigma machine was widely thought to be in practice unbreakable in the 1920s, when a variant of the commercial Model D was first used by the German Navy. The German Army, Navy, Air Force, Nazi party, Gestapo, and German diplomats all used Enigma machines, but there were several variants (e.g., the Abwehr used a four-rotor machine without a plugboard, and Naval Enigma used different key management from that of the Army or Air Force, making its traffic far more difficult to cryptanalyze). Each variant required different cryptanalytic treatment. The commercial versions were not so secure. Dilly Knox, of GC&CS, is said to have broken it during the 1920s.

Breaking the cipher
Main article: Cryptanalysis of the Enigma
The fundamental break into the Enigma systems that were to be used by Nazi Germany was made in Poland in 1932, just on the eve of Adolf Hitler's accession to power, by Marian Rejewski. The 27-year-old mathematician used advanced mathematics (group theory, particularly permutation theory) and cracked the Enigma system. Together with two colleagues at the Polish General Staff's Cipher Bureau (Polish: Biuro SzyfrÃ³w), he went on to develop practical methods of decrypting Enigma traffic. They designed working "doubles" of the Enigmas and developed equipment and techniques which helped in finding the keys needed for decryption (including the "grill," "clock," cyclometer, cryptologic bomb, and perforated sheets). Well before 1938, much German Enigma traffic was being routinely decrypted by the Poles; but accelerating changes in German operations (encipherment procedures, frequency of key changes, greater rotor choice) and looming war led the Poles to share their achievements in Enigma decryption with France and Britain. This happened during the famous meeting at Pyry, in the Kabaty Woods south of Warsaw, on July 25, 1939. Since neither the French nor the British had succeeded in breaking Enigma traffic, this was a major cryptanalytic windfall for Poland's western allies.

Armed with this Polish assistance, the British began work on German Enigma traffic. Work on Enigma after the outbreak of World War II in France, at PC Bruno outside Paris, was done by Polish Cipher Bureau cryptologists who had escaped Poland. Early in 1939 Britain's secret service had installed its Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) at Bletchley Park, 50 miles (80 km) north of London, to work on enemy message traffic. They also set up a large interception network to collect enciphered messages for the cryptologists at Bletchley and at five near-by off-site outstations at Adstock, Gayhurst, Wavendon, Stanmore, and Eastcote. Eventually there was a very large organization controlling the distribution of the resulting â€" secret â€" decrypted information, which came to be called "Ultra." Strict rules were established to restrict the number of people who knew of Ultra (and its origins) in the hope of ensuring that nothing (e.g., leaks, actions) would alert the Axis Powers that the Allies were reading any of their messages. Prior to use of the term Ultra, the product from Bletchley Park was for a time codenamed "Boniface" to give the impression to the uninitiated that the source was a secret agent. Such was the secrecy surrounding reports from "Boniface" that "his" reports were taken directly to Prime Minister Winston Churchill in a locked box to which he personally held the key.

The Bletchley Park workers included a mix of crossword enthusiasts, chess mavens, mathematicians and pioneer computer scientists. Amongst the latter was Alan Turing, one of the founders of modern computing. By 1943, a large proportion of intercepts (over 2,000 daily at the height of operations) were routinely read, including some from Hitler himself. Such information enabled the Allies to maintain an often remarkably accurate picture of enemy plans and orders of battle, and, when appropriately used, was of great value in formulating Allied strategy and tactics.

Methods of cryptanalytic attack
British attacks on the Enigmas were similar to the original Polish methods, but naturally continued evolving to keep pace with the growing complexity of German equipment and procedures. (For a discussion of the many identical techniques used by the Poles and the British, see Kozaczuk 1984, appendix F.) A particular challenge would be German Naval Enigma. Even before the war, it had been a challenge to the Poles; only a portion of Naval Enigma had been read at B.S.-4 (the Cipher Bureau's German section) due to limited Bureau personnel and resources and because knowledge of army and air force traffic had been deemed more important to Poland's defense. (Kozaczuk, pp. 31, 58.)

One mode of attack on the Enigma relied on the fact that the reflector (a patented feature of the Enigma machines) guaranteed that no letter could be enciphered as itself, so an A could not be sent as an A. Another technique counted on common German phrases, such as "Heil Hitler" or "please respond," which were likely to occur in a given plaintext; a successful guess as to a plaintext was known at Bletchley as a crib. With a probable plaintext fragment and the knowledge that no letter could be enciphered as itself, a corresponding ciphertext fragment could often be identified. This provided a clue to message keys.

On some occasions, German cipher clerks helped Allied cryptanalysts. In one instance, a clerk was asked to send a test message, and hit the T key repeatedly and transmitted the resulting letters. A British analyst received from an intercept station a long message containing not a single "T" and immediately realised what had happened. In other cases, as they had before the war, Enigma operators would constantly use the same settings for their message keys, often their own initials or those of a girlfriend (one clerk had a girlfriend named Cillie, and would continuously use CIL as the rotor setup. Bletchley Park named such hints "cillies"). Analysts were set to finding such messages in the sea of daily intercepts, which winnowed out enough possibilities to allow Bletchley to use other original Polish techniques as well to find the initial daily keys. Other German operators used "form letters" for daily reports, notably weather reports, so the same crib might be used every day.

Had the Germans ever replaced every rotor at the same time, the British might not have been able to break back into the system. And had German operating practices been more secure, things would have been much more difficult for the British cryptologists. However, due to the expense and difficulty of getting new rotors to all ships and units, this was never done. Instead the Germans every so often added new rotors to the mix, thereby allowing the British to work out the wirings of the newest rotors.

Use of Ultra
The Allies were seriously concerned with the prospect of the Axis command finding out that they had broken into the Enigma traffic. This was taken to the extreme that, for instance, though they knew from intercepts the whereabouts of U-boats lying in wait in mid-Atlantic, the U-boats often were not hunted unless a "cover story" could be arranged â€" a search plane might be "fortunate enough" to sight the U-boat, thus explaining the Allied attack. Ultra information was used to attack and sink many Afrika Korps supply ships bound for North Africa; but, as in the North Atlantic, every time such information was used, an "innocent" explanation had to be provided: often scout planes were sent on otherwise unnecessary missions, to ensure they were spotted by the Germans. The British were, it is said, more disciplined about such measures than the Americans, and this difference was a source of friction between them.

The distribution of Ultra information to Allied commanders and units in the field involved considerable risk of discovery by the Germans, and great care was taken to control both the information and knowledge of how it was obtained. Liaison officers were appointed for each field command to manage and control dissemination.

In the summer of 1940, British cryptanalysts, who were successfully breaking German Air Force Enigma-cypher variants, were able to give Churchill information about the issuing of maps of England and Ireland to the Sealion invasion forces.

From the beginning, the Naval version of Enigma used a larger selection of rotors than did the Army or Air Force versions, as well as operating procedures that made it much more secure than other Enigma variants. There was no hint at all to the initial settings for the machines, and there was little probable plaintext to use, either. Different and far more difficult methods had to be used to break into Naval Enigma traffic, and with the U-boats running freely in the Atlantic after the fall of France, a more direct approach recommended itself.

On 7 May 1941 the Royal Navy deliberately captured a German weather ship, together with cipher equipment and codes; and two days later U-110 was captured, together with an Enigma machine, code book, operating manual and other information that enabled Bletchley Park to break submarine messages until the end of June. And it was done again shortly afterwards.

Naval Enigma machines or settings books were captured from a total of seven U-boats and eight German surface ships. These included U-boats U-505 (1944) and U-559 (1942) and a number of German weather boats and converted trawlers such as the Krebs, captured during a raid on the Lofoten Islands off Norway. More fantastic scenarios were contemplated, such as Ian Fleming's James Bondian suggestion to "crash" captured German bombers into the sea near German shipping, hoping they would be "rescued" by a ship's crew, which would be taken captive by Commandos concealed in the plane who would capture the cryptographic material intact.

In other cases, the Allies induced the Germans to provide them with cribs. To do this they would drop mines (or take some other action), then listen for messages thus provoked. In the case of mining this or that channel, they expected the word "Minen" to occur in some of the messages. This technique was, at Bletchley, called gardening.

Even these brief periods were enough to markedly affect the course of the war. Charting decrypted Enigma traffic against British shipping losses for a given month shows a strong pattern of increased losses when Naval Enigma was blacked out, and vice versa. But by 1943 so much traffic had been decrypted that Allied cryptologists had an excellent understanding of the messages coming from various locations at various times. Thus a brief message sent from the west at 6 a.m. was likely to have been broadcast by a weather-reporting boat in the Atlantic, and that meant the message would almost certainly contain these cribs; and similarly for other traffic. From this point on, Naval Enigma messages were being read constantly, even after changes to the ground settings.

However, the new tricks only reduced the number of possible settings for a message. The number remaining was still huge, and due to the new rotors that the Germans had added from time to time, that number was much larger than the Poles had faced. In order to solve this problem the Allies, especially the US, "went industrial" and produced much larger versions of the Polish bomba that could rapidly test thousands of possible key settings.

Some Germans had suspicions that all was not right with Enigma. Karl Dönitz received reports of "impossible" encounters between U-boats and enemy vessels which made him suspect some compromise of his communications. In one instance, three U-boats met at a tiny island in the Caribbean, and a British destroyer promptly showed up. They all escaped and reported what had happened. Dönitz immediately asked for a review of Enigma's security. The analysis suggested that the signals problem, if there was one, wasn't due to the Enigma itself. Dönitz had the settings book changed anyway, blacking out Bletchley Park for a period. However, the evidence was never enough to truly convince him that Naval Enigma was being read by the Allies. The more so, since his counterintelligence B-Dienst group, who had partially broken Royal Navy traffic (including its convoy codes early in the war), supplied enough information to support the idea that the Allies were unable to read Naval Enigma. Coincidentally, German success in this respect almost exactly matched in time an Allied blackout from Naval Enigma.

In another case, the Germans became suspicious of Ultra when five ships from Naples headed for North Africa with essential supplies for Rommel's campaign were all mysteriously attacked and sunk by an Allied airforce. As there was no time to have the ships all spotted by the airforce beforehand and then sunk accordingly, the decision went directly to Churchill whether or not to act solely on Ultra intelligence. He gave the simple order "Sink them". Afterwards, a message was sent by the Allies to Naples congratulating a fictitious spy and informing him of his bonus. The Germans decrypted this message and believed it.[1][2]

There were however scenarios in which Ultra intelligence could be taken advantage of with little or no risk of the Germans expecting a compromise. One example would be the military deception preparations for the D-day landings. These involved use of dummy tanks, fake ships and notional armies to fool the Germans into thinking that the Allied invasion would take place at the Pas de Calais, as opposed to Normandy. Ultra intelligence confirmed to the Allies that these deceptions were working and gave all senior decision makers involved greater confidence of a successful invasion.

In 1941 British intelligence learned that the German Navy was about to introduce M4, a new version of Enigma with 4 rotors rather than 3. Fortunately for the Allies, in December a U-boat mistakenly transmitted a message using the four-rotor machine before it was due to be inaugurated. Realizing the error, the U-boat retransmitted the same message using the 3-rotor Enigma, giving the British sufficient clues to break the new machine soon after it became operational on February 1, 1942. The U-boat network which used the four-rotor machine was known as Triton, codenamed Shark by the Allies. Its traffic was routinely readable.

It is commonly claimed that the breaks into Naval Enigma resulted in the war being a year shorter, but given its effects on the Second Battle of the Atlantic alone, that might be an underestimate.

Breaking of some messages (not in German Enigma) led to the defeat of the Italian Navy at Cape Matapan, and was preceded by another "fortuitous" search-plane sighting. British Admiral Cunningham also did some fancy footwork at a hotel in Egypt to prevent Axis agents from taking note of his movements and deducing that a major operation was planned. Ultra information was of considerable assistance to the British (Montgomery being "in the know" about Ultra) at El Alamein in Western Egypt in the long-running battle with the Afrika Korps under Rommel and Intelligence from signals between Adolf Hitler and General Günther von Kluge was of considerable help during the campaign in France just after the Allied D-Day landings, particularly in regard to estimates of when German reserves might be committed to battle. On the other hand, the Red Army was well aware of the German buildup, locations and attack time precisely, prior to the battle of Kursk even without the Ultra information provided to them.

By 1945 almost all German Enigma traffic (Wehrmacht, Kriegsmarine, Luftwaffe, Abwehr, SD, etc.) could be decrypted within a day or two, yet the Germans remained confident of its security. Had they been better informed, they could have changed systems, forcing Allied cryptologists to start over. The Germans considered Enigma traffic so secure that they openly discussed their plans and movements, handing the Allies huge amounts of information. However, Ultra information was also at times misused or ignored. Rommel's intentions just prior to the Battle of the Kasserine Pass in North Africa in 1942 had been suggested by Ultra, but this was not taken into account by the Americans. Likewise, Ultra traffic suggested an attack in the Ardennes in 1944, but the Battle of the Bulge was a surprise to most Allied commanders because the information was disregarded.

After the War, American TICOM project teams found and detained a considerable number of German cryptographic personnel. Among the things they learned was that German cryptographers, at least, understood very well that Enigma messages might be read; they knew Enigma was not unbreakable. They just found it impossible to imagine anyone going to the immense effort required. (See Bamford's Body of Secrets in regard to the TICOM missions immediately after the war.)

An intriguing question concerns alleged use of Ultra information by the "Lucy" spy ring. This was an extremely well informed, and rapidly responsive, ring which was able to get information "directly from the German General Staff Headquarters" â€" often on specific request. It has been alleged that "Lucy" was, in major part, a way for the British to feed Ultra intelligence to the Soviets in a way that made it appear to have come from highly-placed espionage and not from cryptanalysis of German radio traffic. The Lucy ring was operated, apparently, by one man, Rudolf Roessler, and was initially treated with considerable suspicion by the Soviets. The information it provided was accurate and timely, and Soviet agents in Switzerland (including Alexander Rado, the director) eventually took it quite seriously.

Purple decrypts in Europe
In the Pacific theater, the Japanese cipher machine dubbed "Purple" by the Americans, and unrelated to the Enigmas, was used for highest-level Japanese diplomatic traffic. It was also cracked, by the US Army's Signal Intelligence Service. Some Purple decrypts proved useful elsewhere, for instance detailed reports by Japan's ambassador to Germany which were encrypted on the Purple machine. These reports included reviews of German strategy and intentions, reports on direct inspections (in one case, of Normandy beach defenses) by the ambassador, and reports of long interviews with Hitler.

The Japanese are said to have obtained an Enigma machine as early as 1937, although it is debated whether they were given it by their German ally or bought a commercial version which, except for plugboard and actual rotor wirings, was essentially the German Army / Air Force machine.

Postwar public disclosure of Ultra
While it is obvious why Britain and the United States went to considerable pains to keep Ultra a secret until the end of the war, it has been a matter of some conjecture why Ultra was kept officially secret for 29 years thereafter, until 1974. During that period the important contributions to the war effort of a great many people remained unknown, and they were unable to share in the glory of what is likely one of the chief reasons the Allies won the war â€" or, at least, as quickly as they did.

At least three versions exist as to why Ultra was kept secret so long. Each has plausibility. All may be true. First, as David Kahn pointed out in his 1974 New York Times review of F.W. Winterbotham's The Ultra Secret, after World War II the British gathered up all the Enigma machines they could find and sold them to Third World countries, confident that they could continue reading the messages of the machines' new owners. A second explanation relates to a misadventure of Winston Churchill's between the World Wars, when he publicly disclosed information obtained by decrypting Russian secret communications; this had prompted the Russians to change their cryptography, leading to a cryptological blackout. The third explanation is given by Winterbotham (The Ultra Secret, introduction), who recounts that two weeks after V-E Day Churchill requested that former recipients of Ultra intelligence be asked not to divulge the source or the information they had received from it, in order that there might be neither damage to the future operations of the Secret Service nor any cause for the Allies' enemies to blame it for their defeat.

Since it was British and, later, American message-breaking which had been the most extensive, this meant that the importance of Enigma decrypts to the prosecution of the war remained unknown. Discussion by either the Polish or the French of Enigma breaks carried out early in the war would have been uninformed regarding breaks carried out during the balance of the war. Nevertheless it was the public disclosure of Enigma decryption, in the book Enigma (1973) by French Intelligence officer Gustave Bertrand, that generated pressure to discuss the rest of the Enigma/Ultra story.

The British ban was finally lifted in 1974, the year that a key participant on the distribution side of the Ultra project, F.W. Winterbotham, published The Ultra Secret.

The official history of British intelligence in World War II was published in five volumes from 1979 to 1988. It was chiefly edited by Harry Hinsley, with one volume by Michael Howard. There is also a one-volume collection of reminiscences by Ultra veterans, Codebreakers (1993), edited by Hinsley and Alan Stripp.

As mentioned, after the war, surplus Enigmas and Enigma-like machines were sold to many countries around the world, which remained convinced of the security of the remarkable cipher machines. Their traffic was not so secure as they believed, however, which is of course one reason the British and Americans made the machines available. Switzerland even developed its own version of the Enigma, the NEMA, and used it for decades (at least into the late '70s).

Some information about Enigma decryption did get out earlier, however. In 1967 the Polish military historian WÅ‚adysÅ‚aw Kozaczuk in his book Bitwa o tajemnice (Battle for Secrets) first revealed that the German Enigma had been broken by Polish cryptanalysts before World War II. The same year, David Kahn in The Codebreakers described the 1945 capture of a Naval Enigma machine from U-505 and mentioned, somewhat in passing, that Enigma messages were already being read by that time, requiring "machines that filled several buildings." In 1971 Ladislas Farago's The Game of the Foxes gave an early published version of the myth of the purloined Enigma that enabled the British (according to Farago, Alfred Dillwyn Knox) to crack the cipher (Farago also mentions an Abwehr Enigma). By 1970 newer, computer-based ciphers were becoming popular as the world increasingly turned to computerised communications, and the usefulness of Enigma copies (and rotor machines generally) rapidly decreased. It was shortly after this (1974) that a decision was taken to permit some revelations about some Bletchley Park operations.

The United States National Security Agency retired the last of its rotor-based encryption systems, the KL-7 series, in the 1980s.

Difficulties with some disclosures
Many accounts of the Enigma-decryption story, and of other World War II cryptological happenings, have been published. Several are unreliable in many respects. This can be traced to a number of causes:

First, not all authors have been in a position to know. Several books have been published by those on the Ultra distribution side at Bletchley Park, but work there was seriously compartmentalised, making it difficult to credit some alleged episodes if due only to such a source. The story about Churchill deliberately not interfering with a Luftwaffe bombing of Coventry which was known through Enigma decrypts is one such. Peter Calvocoressi's book, Top Secret Ultra, contains a sounder account of the episode than the commonly recounted allegation.
Second, the cryptanalytic work was tricky and quite technical. It requires someone with a considerable understanding of cryptanalysis, and of Enigma, to adequately comprehend -- or explain -- how either worked.
Third, documents have been 'lost' in secret archives. Those not actually lost have taken decades to be released to the public, and some are, presumably, still to be released. In any case, none of them was originally written, nor made available later, with historical clarity in mind; considerable perspective is required to make reasonable use of them.
Fourth, governments have chosen to keep secret or release information to serve their own purposes, not historical accuracy or completeness.
Fifth, several authors have had agendas which took precedence over accuracy in their reports. At least one incident is known of whole-cloth fabrication regarding British cryptanalytic progress on a particular World War II Japanese Navy cryptosystem. The account was claimed to have been written from the unpublished memoirs of the Australian cryptanalyst Eric Nave, but substantive parts of the published version appear to have been simply invented.
Sixth, many writers have not done their research. The fate of the German Enigma spy "AschÃ©" was not publicly known till Hugh Sebag-Montefiore tracked down AschÃ©'s daughter about 1999. Her account appears in Sebag-Montefiore's book.
Seventh, Ultra itself was a top-secret institutionalized mechanism to specifically protect the fact that the Nazi Enigma codes had been broken. In many ways, protecting that secret often had to be more important than using decoded information for immediate strategic gain. Balancing that utility meant that Ultra, without a doubt, placed the secret above individual human life on several, if not many, occasions. For that reason, considering the issue of Ultra, and its 30-year secrecy, means confronting the highly ideological and perhaps convoluted, yet equally necessitated, reasons why nations keep secrets at any expense.
As with other history, but more than for most, the history of cryptography, especially its recent history, should be read carefully, due to its complexity and to possibly confusing or misleading agendas.

Ultra's strategic consequences
There has been controversy about the influence of Allied Enigma decryption on the course of World War II. Probably the question should be broadened to include Ultra's influence not only on the war itself, but on the postwar period as well.

Wartime consequences
An exhibit in 2003 on "Secret War" at the Imperial War Museum, in London, quoted British Prime Minister Winston Churchill telling King George VI, "It was thanks to Ultra that we won the war." Churchill's greatest fear, even after Hitler had suspended Operation Sealion and invaded the Soviet Union, was that the German submarine wolf packs would succeed in strangling sea-locked Britain. He would later write, in Their Finest Hour (1949), "The only thing that ever really frightened me during the war was the U-boat peril." A major factor that averted Britain's defeat in the Battle of the Atlantic was her regained mastery of Naval-Enigma decryption.

There were, however, also other technologies, equipments, and tactics which moved the Battle of the Atlantic in the Allies' favour. As the air gap over the North Atlantic closed and convoys received escort carrier protection, airborne anti-submarine aircraft became extremely efficient hunter-killers with the use of centimetric radar and airborne depth charges. Improvements to Huff-Duff (radio triangulation equipment used as part of ELINT) meant a U-boat's location could be found even if the messages they were sending could not be read (and simply avoiding a known submarine was often sufficient). Improvements to ASDIC (SONAR), coupled with Hedgehog, improved the likelihood of sinking a U-boat.

From February 1942, when Air Marshal Arthur Harris became Air Officer Commanding of Bomber Command, the RAF implemented large-scale night area bombardment of German cities. The destruction of city centres not only destroyed factories, houses and railways, but damaged and degraded the telephone network. This forced the German armed forces, as the war progressed, to rely ever more heavily on encrypted radio traffic, which of course the Allies were able to read.

After D-Day, with the resumption of the strategic bomber campaign over Germany, Harris remained wedded to area bombardment. Historian Frederick Taylor argues, as Harris was not cleared for access to ULTRA, he was given some information gleaned from Enigma but not the information's source. This affected his attitude about post-D-Day directives (orders) to target oil installations, since he did not know senior Allied commanders were using high-level German sources to assess just how much this was hurting the German war effort, so Harris tended to see the directives to bomb specific oil and munitions targets as a "panacea" (his word), and as a distraction from the real task of breaking German morale.[3]

Postwar consequences
F.W. Winterbotham, the first author to limn, in his 1974 book The Ultra Secret, the influence of Enigma decryption on the course of World War II, likewise made the earliest contribution to an appreciation of Ultra's postwar influence, which now continues into the 21st century â€" and not only in the postwar establishment of Britain's GCHQ (Government Communication Headquarters) and the United States' NSA (National Security Agency). "Let no one be fooled," Winterbotham admonishes in chapter 3, "by the spate of television films and propaganda which has made the war seem like some great triumphant epic. It was, in fact, a very narrow shave, and the reader may like to ponder [...] whether [...] we might have won [without] Ultra."

Consequences of Britain's policy of official secrecy
There is a little discussed consequence of Britain officially keeping secret Ultra's existence until 1974.

The secrecy meant that prior to 1974, and doubtless for some time after, historians, generals and other writers had to be deliberately evasive, and therefore inaccurate, about battles, tactics and strategy which they knew, but could not admit, to being influenced by Enigma intelligence, either greatly or in small measure. Other writers not in the know were both misled and in turn misled their readers.

As just one example, readers of British Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery must always keep one eye open for suspected uses of Ultra Intelligence. Montgomery was not able to credit Ultra for many decisions and successes; as mentioned above, the sinking of the Naples convoy to Rommel was one such instance; another was Montgomery's success against Rommel in September 1942 at the Battle of Alam Halfa.

Had the reader prior to 1974 been informed of Ultra then the brilliant career and decision-making of many an Allied General or Admiral would have seemed a little dimmer.

Further reading
A fictional version of this story is told in the novel Enigma by Robert Harris (ISBN 0-09-999200-0) and in the movie made from the novelâ€"see "Enigma (2001 film)." The story is also somewhat covered, fictionally, in Neal Stephenson's Cryptonomicon (ISBN 0-09-941067-2).

A short account of World War II cryptology is Stephen Budiansky's Battle of Wits (2000). It covers more than just the Enigma story.

Hugh Sebag-Montefiore's Enigma: the Battle for the Code (2000), which focuses largely on Naval Enigma, includes some previously unknown informationâ€"and many photographs of individuals involved. Bletchley Park had been his grandfather's house before it was purchased for GC&CS.

David Kahn's Seizing the Enigma (1991) is essentially about the solution of Naval Enigma, based on seizures of German naval vessels. British success in the endeavor almost certainly saved Britain from defeat in the crucial Battle of the Atlantic and thereby made the United States' entry into the war's European theater possible.

Thomas Parrish's The American Codebreakers (earlier published as The Ultra Americans) concentrates on the U.S. contribution to the codebreaking effort.

A brief description of the Enigma, as well as other codes/ciphers, can be found in Simon Singh's The Code Book (1999).

Information on British cryptology appears in the official history of British intelligence in World War II, edited by Sir Harry Hinsley. He also co-edited, with Alan Stripp, a volume of memoirs by participants in the British cryptological effort, Codebreakers: the Inside Story of Bletchley Park (1993).

Marian Rejewski wrote a number of papers on his 1932 break into Enigma and his subsequent work on the cipher, well into World War II, with his fellow mathematician-cryptologists, Jerzy RÃ³Å¼ycki and Henryk Zygalski. Most of Rejewski's papers appear in WÅ‚adysÅ‚aw Kozaczuk's 1984 Enigma: How the German Machine Cipher Was Broken, and How It Was Read by the Allies in World War Two (edited and translated by Christopher Kasparek), which remains the standard reference on the crucial foundations laid by the Poles for World War II Enigma decryption.

Broken Enigma messages are still extremely valuable today, as they provide some of the best surviving direct accounts of the Nazi war effort.

Ronald Lewin's Ultra goes to War (1978)

John Winton's Ultra at Sea (1988)

Patrick Reesly's Very Special Intelligence The Story of the Admiralty's Operational Intelligence Center 1939-1945 (1977)

Nigel West's The SIGINT Secrets The Signals Intelligence War 1900 to Today (1986)

James Bamford's Body of Secrets Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency from the Cold War through the dawn of the New Century (2001)

Leo Marks Between Silk and Cyanide (1998)

References
^ home.earthlink.net
^ gaiaselene.com
^ Taylor, Fredrick. Dresden:Tuesday 13 February 1945. (NY): HarperCollins, ISBN 0-06-000676-5, (Lon): Bloomsbury. ISBN 0-7475-7078-7, 202.

External links
Literature on ULTRA
Andrzej Dabrowa, Ph.D.
Richard Lobodzinski, MsME
Introduction
The following article on Enigma's code breaking history and the effect it had upon progress of WWII was based upon well documented books, reports written by the involved individuals and statements made by the leading Allied leaders. Substantial effort was made to make this article as historically accurate as possible. To avoid confusion by the uninitiated readers the terminology used in this article was greatly simplified (apologies to the insiders of the intelligence craft). Due to the constraint on number of pages the article is limited to the most important facts and events as well as refrains from detailed descriptions. Those who wish to increase their knowledge and/or go into details are directed to the references given at the end of the article.
General references
1. Synopsis
2. Historical background
3. Breaking the Enigma code
4. Polish decrypting effort 1930-1939
5. Polish decrypting effort 1939-1945
6. English decrypting effort - the beginnings
7. England - Bletchley Park
8. United States in the secret war
9. Battle of Britain
10. Invasion of French N. Africa
11. Battle of Atlantic
12. Battle of the terror weapons V1 & V2
13. Conclusion
14. Epilogue
15. References

1. Synopsis
After WW1 Poland found itself squeezed between nationalistic Germany and communist Russia. The Treaty of Versailles, a mere slap on Germany's wrist, offered little security. Political, economic and social unrest gave rise to fascism and to rapid rearmament. Russia, after a bloody revolution, continued its imperialism by engaging in war with Poland and by annexing its Asian neighbors.
When the German army adopted an encrypting machine, called Enigma, for all its high level communication, this created a problem for Polish intelligence in decoding the intercepted German messages. Consequently, in 1932, Poland established a modern cryptology department at the University of Poznan. After few months, three young Polish mathematicians,
Marian Rejewski, Jerzy Rozycki & Henryk Zygalski, derived very smart methods and broke the Enigma code, believed by the Germans to be unbreakable.

For the next few years, before and during the war, Poland had the ability to decrypt intercepted coded German messages. As Enigma evolved into a more complex and sophisticated machine, so too did the Polish methods and techniques. Just before the beginning of WWII the Poles transferred all their know-how and equipment to the French and British Allies for the use in the coming war. When the war started, on September 1st 1939, the Polish cryptologists were quickly evacuated from Poland through Romania to France. By October 1939 the reorganized cryptology unit started to decrypt Enigma messages again. Until the fall of France on June 17th 1940 the Polish unit operated officially in France. After that they went underground in "Vichy" France, where they operated until November 1942 when the Germans occupied southern France. Their escape to neutral, but friendly with Germany, Spain was a disaster as they were apprehended and imprisoned in cruel interment camps. Two key cryptologists and three radio operators managed to escape and reach England, but most fared much worse. Two senior intelligence officers and three engineers were caught by the Gestapo and were sent to German concentration camps. The two officers were liberated by the US Army but the three engineers perished.

The British, using Polish decrypting methods, established a secret organization at Bletchley Park consisting of about 10,000 people to intercept, decrypt and disseminate German Enigma messages and intelligence. Selected Allied high ranking commanders received these decrypted German orders via the Ultra organization starting with the Battle of Britain, through the Battle of the Atlantic, the landing in Africa, the invasion of the Continent and the bombing of the V1 and V2 weapon sites.

The Polish effort in breaking Enigma's code shortened World War II in Europe by 6 to 12 months, sparing hundreds of thousand of casualties and saving Western Europe from occupation by the Red Army. This, however, did little to help Poland, which was abandoned to the mercy of communism by its allies. Fifty years of oppression brought economic disaster and personal suffering to its 35 million people. None of the Polish cryptologists received any recognition from the French, British or Americans.
In the year 2000 the Polish president, Mr. Aleksander Kwasniewski, made postmortem awards of the highest Polish military medals to Marian Rejewski, Jerzy Rozycki and Henryk Zygalski. The breaking of the Enigma code has been singled out by many war historians and great leaders as one of the greatest contributions to the war effort.

Polish military plane CASA (made in Spain) with 10 on board crashes today.

WARSAW (Reuters) - A Polish military plane crashed in northern Poland late on Wednesday, with at least one of the 10 people on board feared dead, emergency service officials said.
"According to the information we received from the air force there were 10 people on board, including 4 crew," a fire department spokesman Pawel Fratczak told TVN24 television.
TVN24 said at least one person died in the crash, which occurred as the Spanish-made CASA 295m transport plane was approaching a military airport for landing.
It was carrying officials taking part in an aviation safety conference, TVN24 said
Army plane crash in Poland kills 7
Thu, 24 Jan 2008 00:29:57

A CASA C-295M plane
A military plane with 10 people onboard has crashed in northern Poland killing at least seven of its passengers, emergency officials say.

The plane was approaching the airport of Miroslawiec in northwestern Poland when it crashed, said Monika Bak, a spokeswoman for Polish emergency services.

According to Pawel Fratczak, a fire department spokesman, the plane was carrying six passengers and four crew members from Warsaw when it fell to a 'wooded area' from a height of about 500-650 feet and about 2 miles from the Miroslawiec airport.

It was the Spanish-made plane, a CASA, carrying officials taking part in an aviation safety conference.

Tuesday, January 22, 2008

With dollar's decline, Poles head to US to spend

With dollar's decline, Poles head to US to spend
The Associated Press
Jan. 22, 2008 10:22 AM

WARSAW, Poland - There was a time when Poles kept their life savings in dollars tucked under mattresses or hidden in socks, counting on the greenback's strength to help them weather the blows of political turmoil, inflation and their own weak currency.

But no more.

The dollar has not only fallen against the euro, but even against the currencies of emerging economies like Poland's, giving unprecedented spending power to a resurgent middle class since the fall of the Iron Curtain.

"During communism, the dollar seemed like a god," said economist Irmina Kurzawska. "But now the dollar is getting weaker and weaker - it seems to be endless."

In the past year alone, the dollar has fallen 21 percent against the Polish currency, from 3 zlotys in January 2007 to a nearly 13-year low of 2.3949 on Jan. 15. The dollar traded at 2.5263 zlotys on Tuesday.

Gone are the days when Americans could live like kings in the region. Today U.S. expatriates and tourists are being squeezed tighter as the dollar buys them ever less of the local currency.

Meanwhile, Poles, who have historically immigrated in droves to the United States to earn those once-prized dollars, are these days just as likely to catch a direct flight to New York for sightseeing and a show on Broadway - and snap up some bargains while there. The newly opened arrivals hall at Warsaw Frederic Chopin Airport, a spacious new terminal of glass and steel, itself attests to the country's growing wealth.

Ewa Wdowiarska, 37, a company director, returned Friday from a four-week shopping trip in New York with her husband and young daughter - and a car.

"It wasn't my first visit to the U.S., but the first time I went only to shop - and it was because of the weak dollar," she said as she pushed a cart piled high with suitcases through the terminal.

The family picked up a one-year-old Mazda6 for $15,000, a bargain even with transport costs since the same car would cost double that in Poland, she said. They also bought clothing, a cell phone and KitchenAid equipment for a house they just had built.

"I earn money in Poland and spend it in the USA - this is something new for Polish people," Wdowiarska said. "The world has changed."

Michal Mroz, 26, a businessman from Krakow, traveled this month to Chicago for work - but slipped in some shopping while there, picking up $700 worth of clothing from Banana Republic, Eddie Bauer and shoes from Ecco.

"You pay three times as much in Poland for brand clothing," he said. "It's rather cheap in the States."

Other benefits of the weak dollar have meant that oil and gas, which are priced in dollars on the international market, have not risen at Polish pumps as drastically as they have for Americans.

But not all Poles are rejoicing - those who are paid in dollars or who rely heavily on American customers are feeling the pinch.

Take Anna Baczkowska, a small shop owner in Warsaw who sells traditional Polish pottery from the town of Boleslawiec, a highly decorated blue-toned ceramic that is popular with many Americans.

She says the weak dollar has caused her sales to fall by about 20 percent each year for the past several years.

"Customers are always thinking about the dollar, complaining that the dollar isn't so good," said Baczkowska, sitting in her office in the back of her shop, ANKO. "I don't have many Americans buying now."

Poland still has its problems in trying to overcome the economic legacy of communism.

Though salaries are rising amid strong economic growth, they still only average around $1,310 per month, making cross-ocean shopping sprees off limits to many.

The country also suffers from a jobless rate of more than 11 percent, while the low wages have driven hundreds of thousands to seek work in Britain and Ireland since Poland joined the European Union in 2004.

Nonetheless, heavy foreign investments and EU subsidies - which have helped drive the zloty higher - have fueled an economic boom that is bringing new life to the long-embattled middle class.

Marcin Panek, 27, a private banker, returned Saturday from a vacation to Florida where he visited Disney World and soaked up rays in Miami Beach, escaping the cold, dark Polish January. He also bought clothes at Gap, Banana Republic and Abercrombie and Fitch, while splurging on a $400 iPhone.

"It's a good time to do everything because it's all cheaper now," Panek said, pulling two large red suitcases through the airport. "It's still richer in the States, but Poland is getting closer."

Sunday, January 20, 2008

America views Poland "as a playground rather than a player.

America views Poland "as a playground rather than a player.

Sunday, January 20, 2008
WASHINGTON - This week, Polish Defense Minister Bogdan Klich traveled to Washington to negotiate his country's participation in the US antiballistic missile-defense system. In a break with previous policy, the new center-right government of Prime Minister Donald Tusk has demanded fresh concessions – cash, Patriot missiles, and security guarantees – in exchange for hosting the bases on Polish soil.
The visit provided America with its first glimpse of a more assertive Poland, whose leaders are determined to drive a "hard bargain" for support of US policies. Warsaw's new mind-set is replicated across the capitals of the "New Europe," where officials are weary of what they see as Washington's failure to reward its allies for support in the Iraq war.
One notable exception to this trend is Romania. Like Poland, Romania sent troops to Iraq and has been disappointed by its exclusion from the US Visa Waiver Program. But unlike Poland, Romania has welcomed the construction of American military bases. Three features of US strategy toward Romania allowed it to succeed and could provide a blueprint for revitalizing relations with American allies worldwide.
First, in contrast to its dealings with Warsaw, Washington has worked to maintain a relationship with Bucharest on reciprocal footing. When Bucharest backed the US bid for exclusion from the International Criminal Court, Washington backed Romania's bid to join NATO.
When Bucharest granted America access to its airspace early in the Iraq war, Washington granted Romania its coveted designation as a "functional market economy." And when Bucharest cosponsored a US push for Iraqi sovereignty at the United Nations, Washington agreed to locate lucrative US bases on Romania's Black Sea coast.
In each instance, Romanian assistance was matched – usually within one or two months – by US backing for a specific Romanian interest. By contrast, for years the Poles have watched their leaders fly to Washington seeking help – on oil contracts, military aid, visas – only to come away empty-handed. Hence the desire for upfront perks in the talks this week on missile defense.
Second, Washington has been careful to maintain the appearance of an equal relationship with Romania. In negotiations over US bases, the Bush administration stressed that ultimate sovereignty for the installations would rest with Bucharest. As David McKiernan, America's top Army general in Europe, often told the press, "We are guests, tenants." Such humility was necessary, Washington knew, for Bucharest to convince its citizens they were partners rather than pawns of US policy.
Failure to take a similar tack with Poland has done much to fuel problems on missile defense. By failing to consult Warsaw and Prague before offering Russian observers access to the bases, Washington unwittingly tapped into a deep-seated regional fear of being "talked over" by the Great Powers. As a former Polish diplomat told me, the move confirmed that America views Poland "as a playground rather than a player."

Third, in its dealings with Romania, Washington has eschewed the temptation to try to operate today's alliances on the logic that guided alliances during the cold war. This holds that countries stand with America in pursuit of common values, over virtually limitless time horizons, and without any need for enticements. With Romania, Washington has pursued finite goals over a short time frame with frequent quid pro quos to incentivize cooperation.
Why not take a similar approach with Warsaw? A Pentagon official told me, "Romania is not likely to be as significant an ally as Poland over the long-term." That's right: current US thinking holds that it shouldn't reward its most valuable allies. In Washington's view, "mature" partners don't require coaxing – they support America for the sheer satisfaction of knowing they're friends with the sole remaining superpower.
The problem with this approach is that it no longer works. As the Pentagon discovered in meetings with Mr. Klich, Poland is not prepared to move an inch on missile defense until Washington provides offsets to justify hosting the system.
This is not, as some critics say, extortion; it is reciprocity – a feature of healthy, interest-based alliances from time immemorial. Like politicians anywhere, Poland's new leaders have to be able to show that risks undertaken on behalf of a foreign power bring tangible benefits to their own citizens. Failure to do so contributed to the fall from grace of Tusk's predecessor, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, Britain's Tony Blair, and Australia's John Howard.
A breakthrough on missile defense is unlikely this year: Congress doesn't want to release the funds and Bush doesn't have enough political capital to change their minds. Whatever the next president does with the system, he or she should take a close look at which methods have worked – and which ones haven't – in America's recent interactions with allies. Keeping their support in the post-unipolar age will probably prove more valuable than 10 missile shields.
A. Wess Mitchell is director of research at the Center for European Policy Analysis, a Washington-based institute dedicated to the study of Central Europe.

America views Poland "as a playground rather than a player.

Poland became the latest of several Western and Arab countries to pledge military aid to Lebanon

DUBAI, UAE — The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) has begun to establish a joint Special Operations command to group the military’s elite units.
“The Lebanese Special Operations Command is being structured, and staffing has started after a commander was selected to head the job,” a senior Lebanese military official said.
Lebanese Special Operations forces will include the airborne brigade, the Commandos Regiment, the Sea Commandos Regiment and the military intelligence Counter-Sabotage Regiment, which also handles terrorism, the official said.
“The initial size of the force will be around 5,000 troops, which is just under the strength of two brigades,” he said. “But the ultimate goal is to build the force to be two to three brigades within few years.”
Lebanese defense analysts hailed the move as necessary and overdue.
“The threats facing Lebanon are mostly asymmetrical in nature involving armed militias and extremists entrenched in Palestinian refugee camps,” said Ahmed Temsah, a Beirut defense analyst and retired Lebanese Air Force brigadier general. “So the elite units would be better suited and properly armed to confront such challenges than regular troops.”
Operationally, the LAF has been relatively unaffected by the country’s political turmoil, going about its business professionally, the senior Lebanese military official said.
Yet the LAF chief, Lt. Gen. Michel Suleiman, may soon become embroiled in politics. After President Emile Lahoud’s term ended Nov. 24, rival Lebanese political factions and the League of Arab States nominated Suleiman to take the job.
But the Lebanese constitution forbids a senior civil service employee and military officers to run for elections.
The factions behind Suleiman’s nomination have yet to agree on the political process that would amend the constitution and bring him into office.
Suleiman paid a Jan. 14 visit to the Special Operations training base in Roumieh, watching a joint exercise by troops from the Commandos Regiments and the Counter-Sabotage Regiment.
“The LAF today is more unified and more immune to internal divisions than before because of the sacrifices in blood its troops made in battles with terrorism last year,” he told the troops afterwards.
Suleiman was referring to the three-month battles between the LAF and al-Qaida-affiliated extremists of Fatah Al-Islam at the Palestinian Nahr Al-Bared refugee camp in northern Lebanon.
More Aid
Poland became the latest of several Western and Arab countries to pledge military aid to Lebanon with a promise to deliver by March $12 million in ammunition, including some for the LAF’s Soviet-built T-54/55 tanks, 130mm guns, 120mm mortars and multiple-rocket launchers, the military official said.
A Belgian promise to sell 40 Leopard 1 tanks and 32 YPR armored infantry fighting vehicles to Beirut is expected to become reality soon, now that a government needed to endorse the deal has formed in Brussels.
The latest batch of U.S. materiel, 100 two-and-half-ton trucks, arrived on Dec. 22.
“By the end of January 2008, the U.S. will have provided 200 cargo trucks with more expected throughout 2008,” said a statement by the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. “In addition, the U.S. recently provided to the LAF ammunition worth more than $3.5 million, fulfilling a request made by the government of Lebanon. In the past two years, the U.S. has provided more than $271 million dollars in grant assistance to the LAF.”
Sources at the LAF expect the U.S. aid to continue as strong in 2008 and anticipate the value of the new aid package to be in the range of $200 million. U.S. Embassy officials could not confirm this figure or say how much would be given. å

Wednesday, January 16, 2008

Polacy pomagaja Stanom Zjednoczonych USA

Polacy pomagaja Stanom Zjednoczonych USA

Hello from Polish American Lech Alex Bajan of Arlington Virginia.

Jako Polak z USA of 1987 musze podac moje rozrzalenie z tej niesprawiedliwosci jaka jest w dzisiejszym swiecie w traktowaniu Polski i Polakow.

Polacy pomagaja Stanom Zjednoczonych USA : Iraq, Afghanistan , Kosovo, Panama, Haiti, Polish Army's Peacekeepers in Golan Heights.

Co mamy z tego. Gdzie te kontrakty w Iraku? Nic z tego? Ile to nas Polske i Polakow kosztuje. Mozna by za to zaplacic dlugi wszyskich szpitali w Polsce w wyslac na studia lazdego Polaka a albo podwoic swiadczenia dla najbardziej ubogich.
Co nasz Rzad robi w tej sprawie?
Dlaczaego nie mamy dobrego lobingu w USA. A ja moge pomoc. Jestem 20 lat w Washington DC i wiem jak to dziala.
Przed rostrzygniecien kontraktu w Iraku juz bylem poinformowany ze US kontrakt nie bedzie dla Polski a dla firmy belego sekretarza wojsk USA.

Former Republican Congressman and Secretary of Defense, under President Clinton, William Cohen, sits at the helm of the Cohen Group.
On dostal wiele kontraktow ktore sie Polsce nalezaly.

Nawet byly wypowiedzi Ministra Wojsk Irackich ze kontrakt nie zostal dobrze wypelniony przez firme Cohena: ze wiele sprzetu po dostarczeniu nawet nie dzialalo.

Czy tak chca zniszczyc i tanio wykupic Polski przemysl zbrojeniowy.

Sam pochodze z Krasnika w Lubeskim gdzie slawna na calym swiecie Fabryka Lozysk Tocznych wybudowana w ramach Centralnego Osrodka Przemyslowego w latach 20-30 XX wieki i calkowicie z modernizowana przez firmy japonsko – zachodnio europejskie w latach 80-tych za wiele miliardow dolarow. Ktora kiedys exportowala do 70 krajow swiata i zatrudniala 12 tys. Pracownikow

Zobarztmy tylko dane:

Polacy pomagaja Stanom Zjednoczonych USA

Country
Three Years Before 9/11 ('99-'01)
Three Years After 9/11 ('02-'04)
Change in Dollars
Six-Year Total ('99-'04)

Israel
$9,823,862,000 $9,094,874,000 ($728,988,000) $18,918,736,000
Egypt
$6,122,603,000 $6,025,456,540 ($97,146,460) $12,148,059,540
Pakistan
$9,075,000 $4,152,654,219 $4,143,579,219 $4,161,729,219
Jordan
$981,050,000 $2,670,414,688 $1,689,364,688 $3,651,464,688
Colombia
$1,549,497,000 $2,048,565,665 $499,068,665 $3,598,062,665
Afghanistan
$8,415,000 $2,663,783,836 $2,655,368,836 $2,672,198,836
Turkey
$5,357,000 $1,324,923,070 $1,319,566,070 $1,330,280,070
West Bank and Gaza
$630,557,000 $271,058,000 ($359,499,000) $901,615,000
Peru
$263,543,000 $445,825,971 $182,282,971 $709,368,971
Bolivia
$281,470,000 $320,682,000 $39,212,000 $602,152,000
Ecuador
$110,103,000 $251,367,795 $141,264,795 $361,470,795
Poland
$33,242,000 $301,136,119 $267,894,119 $334,378,119
Iraq
$37,945,000 $283,986,478 $246,041,478 $321,931,478
Haiti
$176,368,000 $87,296,000 ($89,072,000) $263,664,000
Indonesia
$78,126,000 $184,930,913 $106,804,913 $263,056,913
Philippines
$14,642,000 $245,636,802 $230,994,802 $260,278,802
Mexico
$89,957,000 $162,080,493 $72,123,493 $252,037,493
Lebanon
$66,417,000 $110,109,000 $43,692,000 $176,526,000
Timor-Leste
$84,791,000 $89,339,000 $4,548,000 $174,130,000
Bahrain
$693,000 $144,593,000 $143,900,000 $145,286,000

http://polishdeportedfromus.blogspot.com/ my blog

Support Our Allies - They Support Us?
"...For Your Freedom and Ours..."
Gen. T. Kosciuszko (Poland and America's Patriot)

- Poland sent combat troops to Iraq, Afghanistan , Kosovo, Panama, Haiti, Polish Army's Peacekeepers in Golan Heights, Americans during the war.
- Polish troops are responsible for security in 1 of the 4 zones in Iraq
- 20,000 soldiers from 17 countries served under Polish command
Poland sent its elite commando unit, GROM, which means thunder. It helped secure the port at Umm Qasr, which was vital to delivering aid to Iraq. The unit also secured nearby oil platforms before they could be sabotaged.

In the first Gulf War, Polish intelligence officers snuck into Iraq to rescue a group of CIA operatives trapped behind enemy lines.

Poland's secret agents disguised CIA agents as Polish construction workers and smuggled them out of Baghdad.
This was not the first time Polish soldiers risked their lives for our freedom. Generals Casimir Pulaski and Tadeusz Kosciuszko were two of the first foreigners to fight in the American Revolution. Kosciuszko designed and oversaw the construction of West Point. After that, he returned to Poland, where he led a democratic uprising. As a result of that fight, Poland had the first written democratic constitution in Europe, second in the world only to the U.S.

USA DEPORTED POLISH WOMAN IN US SINCE 1989 PERFECT CITIZEN FORMER SOLIDARITY, PERFECT MOTHER, NO CRIMES

I have to bring to your attention. What kind of:
How autocratic our Homeland Security in US is.

Ciekawy wiadomosc prasowa:

Israel to Get $30bn US Defense Aid

RAMALLAH/GAZA CITY, 30 July 2007 — Prime Minister Ehud Olmert yesterday announced a new $30 billion US defense aid package to preserve Israel’s regional military superiority, as he appreciated Washington’s wishes to boost moderate Arab states through weapons sales.

“This is an increase of 25 percent for the military aid to Israel from the United States. I think this is a significant and important increase in defense aid to Israel,” Olmert said at the opening of the weekly Israeli Cabinet meeting.

Olmert added that the aid package was offered during his meeting with US President George W. Bush in Washington on June 20.

“This would mean a lot to Israel’s security, and this is a good opportunity to thank President Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice,” Olmert said.

Other Israeli ministers stressed during the Cabinet meeting Israel’s need to secure its “quality advantage” over its neighbors in the Mideast and the US’ major role in maintaining this advantage.

“Defense aid to Israel is still a top priority for the United States,” Olmert told the Cabinet, adding that Israel enjoys more financial assistance than other countries in the Middle East.

“We have renewed agreements and a renewed commitment from the Americans that would help preserve our advantage over the Arab countries,” Olmert said, referring to reports by the New York Times and the Washington Post that the US is mulling a $20 billion arms deal with Gulf states and increasing military aid to Egypt to $13 billion over 10 years.

The deal with Gulf states includes advanced satellite-guided bombs, upgrades to their fighter jets and new naval vessels. It has reportedly raised concerns in Israel and among its supporters in the Congress. However, Olmert said that Israel fully understood the US’ need to support the moderate states in the region.

“We understand the US’ need to assist the moderate Arab states, which are standing in one front with the United States and us in the struggle against Iran,” Olmert said, referring to its nuclear program.

Israeli security officials called the increase in military aid “an unusual achievement.”

According to Israeli diplomatic sources, the final details about the new aid package to the Jewish state will be worked out during the visit by US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns to the region, adding that his visit is slated for mid-August.

US defense aid to Israel began in 1973 but a regular 10-year aid plan — with the previous one expiring this summer — was institutionalized in 1977 as part of the Egypt-Israel peace agreement, the official said.

The military aid is made up of 75 percent US military hardware, ranging from ammunition to warplanes, with the other 25 percent in cash, which goes mainly toward securing new Israeli-made weapons.

Meanwhile, a new Palestinian government platform drawn up by Prime Minister Salam Fayyad pledges, in an indirect swipe at the Islamist group Hamas, to prevent the use of violence in the name of Islam.

An official English-language translation, released yesterday, of the policy document said that Fayyad’s administration would build a clearcut strategy to “enhance the status of Islam as a religion of tolerance.”

At the same time, the platform said, the government would prevent “the use of Islam to justify killings, exclusion of others and destruction.”

The phrasing was clearly aimed at Hamas who took control of Gaza last month in fighting with President Mahmoud Abbas’ secular Fatah faction.

The group has accused Abbas, based in the West Bank where Fatah holds sway, of carrying out a coup by setting up the new government without Hamas, which won an election 18 months ago. Palestinian officials on Friday confirmed that the new platform omits the phrase “armed struggle” and “resistance” against Israeli occupation.

A spokeswoman for Olmert has welcomed the new language. Hamas has rebuffed international demands to recognize Israel and renounce violence.

In another development, more than 100 Palestinians stranded for weeks in Egypt after the Hamas takeover of Gaza began returning home yesterday, crossing into Israel and riding buses to a crossing point between Israel and northern Gaza.

The first three Palestinians crossed into Gaza through the Erez checkpoint late yesterday afternoon. They were greeted with kisses and hugs from relatives, who rushed them away from the scene in cars.

The violent Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip last month triggered the closure of the Rafah border crossing with Egypt, which was run by Palestinian security with European supervision and Israeli security in the background — stranding about 6,000 Palestinians on the Egyptian side. During the violence, the European monitors fled and Hamas militiamen took control of the terminal.

Earlier yesterday, about 1,000 Palestinians gathered in a stadium in the Egyptian town of El-Arish, where authorities read the names of 105 people who they said were approved by Israel to return to Gaza.

Alex Lech Bajan
Polish American
RAQport Inc.
2004 North Monroe Street
Arlington Virginia 22207
Washington DC Area
USA
TEL: 703-528-0114
TEL2: 703-652-0993
FAX: 703-940-8300
EMAIL: office@raqport.com
WEB SITE: http://raqport.com

Sunday, January 13, 2008

Half of These Holocaust Victims Were Non-Jewish.

Half of These Holocaust Victims Were Non-Jewish.
On August 22, 1939, a few days before the official start of World War II, Hitler authorized his commanders, with these infamous words, to kill "without pity or mercy, all men, women, and children of Polish descent or language. Only in this way can we obtain the living space [lebensraum] we need". Heinrich Himmler echoed Hitler's decree:
"All Poles will disappear from the world.... It is essential that the great German people should consider it as its major task to destroy all Poles."
On September 1, 1939, Hitler invaded Poland from three directions. Hitler's invincible troops attacked from the west, the north and the south. Poland never had a chance. By October 8, 1939, Polish Jews and non-Jews were stripped of all rights and, were subject to special legislation. Rationing, which allowed for only bare sustenance of food and medicine was quickly set up.
Young Polish men were forcibly drafted into the German army.
The Polish language was forbidden. Only the German language was allowed.
All secondary schools and colleges were closed.
The Polish press was liquidated. Libraries and bookshops were burned.
Polish art and culture were destroyed.
Polish churches and snyagogues were burned.
Most of the priests were arrested and sent to concentration camps.
Street signs were either destroyed or changed to new German names. Polish cities and towns were renamed in German.
Ruthless obliteration of all traces of Polish history and culture.
Hitler's Goal: Terrorize Polish People Into Subservience.
Hundreds of Polish community leaders, mayors, local officials, priests, teachers, lawyers, judges, senators, doctors were executed in public.
Much of the rest of the so-called Intelligentsia, the Polish leading class, was sent to concentration camps where they later died.The first mass execution of World War II took place in Wawer, a town near Warsaw, Poland on December 27, 1939 when 107 Polish non-Jewish men were taken from their homes in the middle of the night and shot.
This was just the beginning of the street roundups and mass executions that continued throughout the war.
At the same time, on the eastern border of Poland, the Soviet Union invaded and quickly conquered. Germany and the Soviet Union divided Poland in half. The western half, occupied by the Nazis, became a new German territory: "General Gouvernment". The eastern half was incorporated within the adjoining Russian border by Soviet "elections". This new border "realignment" conferred Soviet citizenship on its new Polish inhabitants. And all young Polish men were subject to being drafted into the Soviet army.Just like the Nazis the Soviets also reigned terror in Poland. The Soviets took over Polish businesses, Polish factories and destroyed churches and religious buildings. The Polish currency (zloty) was removed from circulation. All Polish banks were closed and savings accounts were blocked. During the period of the Holocaust of World War II, Poland lost:
45% of her doctors,
57% of her attorneys
40% of her professors,
30% of her technicians,
more than 18% of her clergy
most of her journalists.
Poland's educated class was purposely targeted because the Nazis knew that this would make it easier to control the country. Non-Jews of Polish descent suffered over 100,000 deaths at Auschwitz. The Germans forcibly deported approximately 2,000,000 Polish Gentiles into slave labor for the Third Reich. The Russians deported almost 1,700,000 Polish non-Jews to Siberia. Men, women and children were forced from their homes with no warning. Transferred in cattle cars in freezing weather, many died on the way. Polish children who possessed Aryan-looking characteristics were wrenched from their mother's arms and placed in German homes to be raised as Germans. The Polish people were classified by the Nazis according to their racial characteristics. The ones who appeared Aryan were deported to Lodz for further racial examination. Most of the others were sent to the Reich to work in slave labor camps. The rest were sent to Auschwitz to die. Polish Christians and Catholics were actually the first victims of the notorious German death camp. For the first 21 months after it began in 1940, Auschwitz was inhabited almost exclusively by Polish non-Jews. The first ethnic Pole died in June 1940 and the first Jew died in October 1942. Because of the obliteration of the Polish press by the Nazis, most of the world was not aware, including many parts of Nazi-occupied Poland, of the atrocities going on. Even to this day, much documentation of the Holocaust is not available. The entire records of Auschwitz were stolen by the Soviets and not returned. It was Hitler's goal to rewrite history.
The Nazis destroyed books, monuments, historical inscriptions. They began a forceful campaign of propaganda to convince the world of the inferiority and weakness of the Polish people and likewise, their invincible superiority and power.

Friday, January 11, 2008

Anna Jantar - Nic Nie Może Wiecznie Trwać

Prezydent USA na bliskim wschodzie, sprawa tarczy antyrakietowej

Prezydent USA na bliskim wschodzie, sprawa tarczy antyrakietowej
dr Mieczysław Ryba (2008-01-11)
Aktualności dnia
słuchaj zapisz

Wednesday, January 9, 2008

Decyzje min. Sikorskiego

Decyzje min. Sikorskiego
kpt. Zbigniew Sulatycki (2008-01-09)
Aktualności dnia
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Sunday, January 6, 2008

Marek Grechuta - Ojczyzna

Świetny film o Polsce , oby takich więcej

Świetny film o Polsce , oby takich więcej.

THE FRENCH AND BRITISH BETRAYAL OF POLAND IN 1939

In 1939 Britain and France signed a series of military agreements with Poland that contained very specific promises. The leaders of Poland understood very clearly that they had no chance against Germany alone.
The French, in fact, promised the Poles in mid-May 1939 that in the event of German aggression against Poland, France would launch an offensive against the Germans "no later than fifteen days after mobilization". This promise was sealed in a solemn treaty signed between Poland and France.
Unfortunately, when Germany attacked, Poland was almost totally and completely betrayed by its democratic "friends". While Britain and France did declare war, French troops made a brief advance toward the Siegfried Line on Germany's western frontier and immediately stopped upon meeting German resistance.
This is very significant since Hitler had concentrated almost all German military forces in the east, and France had one of the strongest armies in the world. Had France attacked Germany in a serious way as promised, the results could have been very serious, if not disastrous for the Germans.
Instead, Hitler was able to win a complete victory over Poland and then mobilize his forces for a devastating offensive in the west in the next year.
The British and French betrayal of Poland in 1939 was not only dishonest, it was a military stupidity of truly monumental dimensions. Unfortunately, more betrayals would follow. Contrary to their assurances to the Poles Britain and France would agree to allow Russia to keep the parts of Poland seized as part of their deal with Hitler in 1939. They were to be compensated by the ethnic cleansing of all Germans from lands that had been German for over 1000 years creating a humanitarian catastrophe at the end of the war.
A crowning humiliation of the Poles was the refusal of their British "friends" to allow the free Polish army to march in the victory parade at the end of the war for fear of offending a Soviet puppet government in Lublin.
During World War II Poland suffered through one of the worst occupations in history, losing roughly six million of its citizens to mass murder and deportation at the hands of both the Germans and the Russians. Among these were three million Polish Jews, whose society, language, and way of life were almost completely eradicated in the gas chambers of the Nazi death camps.
After the war it had to suffer 45 years as colony of the Soviet Union as result of agreement signed by its "friends" Britain and America.
THE DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND • MILITARY PREPARATIONS • THE FINAL DECEPTIONS: AUGUST 1939
CONCLUSION • ENDNOTES
THE DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND
Great Britain and Poland
British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain stated in the House of Commons on March 31, 1939.
"As the House is aware, certain consultations are now proceeding with other Governments. In order to make perfectly clear the position of His Majesty's Government in the meantime before those consultations are concluded, I now have to inform the House that during that period, in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence, and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces, His Majesty's Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish Government all support in their power. They have given the Polish Government an assurance to this effect. I may add that the French Government have authorized me to make it plain that they stand in the same position in this matter as do His Majesty's Government."[1]
Having secured a guarantee, the Poles now took steps toward coordinating their defensive preparations with the British. On April 4, 1939, Poland's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Józef Beck, visited London for talks with Prime Minister Chamberlain and Lord Halifax, the Foreign Secretary. The content of these talks was described in an official communiqué sent from London to Warsaw on April 6th:
"The conversations with M. Beck have covered a wide field and shown that the two Governments are in complete agreement upon certain general principles. It was agreed that the two countries were prepared to enter into an agreement of a permanent and reciprocal character to replace the present temporary and unilateral assurance given by His Majesty's Government to the Polish Government. Pending the completion of the permanent agreement, M. Beck gave His Majesty's Government an assurance that the Polish Government would consider themselves under an obligation to render assistance to His Majesty's Government under the same conditions as those contained in the temporary assurance already given by His Majesty's Government to Poland."[2]
Shortly thereafter a formal agreement between Poland and Britain was signed which clearly stated "If Germany attacks Poland His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will at once come to the help of Poland."[3]
France and Poland
Whereas British support of Poland was a relatively recent diplomatic development, Poland's alliance with the French had a long history. The first French efforts to buttress Poland against Germany went back to 1921. In that year, Raymond Poincaré, soon to become president of the French Republic, had stated "Everything orders us to support Poland: The [Versailles] Treaty, the plebiscite, loyalty, the present and the future interest of France, and the permanence of peace."[4]
To this end France had sealed a mutual assistance pact with Poland on February 21, 1921. According to Article One of this pact France and Poland agreed to "consult each other on all questions of foreign policy which concern both states." Furthermore, Article Three made it clear that "If, notwithstanding the sincerely peaceful views and intentions of the two contracting states, either or both of them should be attacked without giving provocation, the two governments shall take concerted measures for the defense of their territory and the protection of their legitimate interests."[5] This agreement for mutual defense was then augmented on September 15, 1922 by a formal military alliance signed by Marshal Foch and General Sokoski. This agreement stated explicitly "In case of German aggression against either Poland or France, or both, the two nations would aid each other to the fullest extent."[6]
Seventeen years later, Poland and France, facing growing tension with Germany, found it necessary to reaffirm the defensive alliance they had formed in the wake of World War I.[7] In mid-May of 1939, Poland's Minister of War, General Tadeusz Kasprzycki, visited Paris for a series of talks. At issue for Kasprzycki was clarifying the terms under which France would assist Poland militarily. These talks resulted in the Franco-Polish Military Convention which, according to historian Richard Watt, stated that "on the outbreak of war between Germany and Poland, the French would immediately undertake air action against Germany. It was also agreed that on the third day of French mobilization its army would launch a diversionary offensive into German territory, which would be followed by a major military offensive of the full French army to take place no later than fifteen days after mobilization."[8]
MILITARY PREPARATIONS
Polish Expectations, British and French Promises
Understandably, throughout the spring and summer of 1939 officials in Warsaw drew strength from the numerous assurances made by France and Great Britain that Poland would not stand alone if war with Germany was to break out. For its part, the Polish military was under no illusion that it could defend against a German assault for more than a few weeks. Although Poland could field one of the largest armies on the European continent, its troops were only lightly armed in comparison to their German counterparts. In terms of modern weaponry, Poland was also severely lacking in armored vehicles and tanks, and its air force was hopelessly outmatched by the German Luftwaffe. Strategically speaking, Polish generals envisioned fighting the Germans at the frontier and then slowly retreating toward the southeastern corner of the country, where an escape route into neighboring Rumania existed. The Poles thus fully expected the Germans to advance deeply into their country. Their sole hope was that Polish forces could hold on long enough for French troops and British air power to attack Germany's western border and draw off enough German divisions to allow a Polish counterattack.[9] After all, France had promised in May to launch a major offensive within two weeks of any German attack.
Expectations of swift Allied action were also repeatedly reinforced by the British. For example, during Anglo-Polish General Staff talks held in Warsaw at the end of May, the Poles stressed the need for British aerial assaults on Germany should war break out. The British responded with assurances that the Royal Air Force would attack industrial, civilian, and military targets.[10] General Sir Edmund Ironside then repeated this promise during an official visit to Warsaw in July. The Poles could be confident that Britain would carry out bombing raids in Germany once hostilities began.[11]
The Reality: English and French Duplicity
At the same time that Allied politicians and military officers were promising to help Poland fight a war against Nazi Germany, events going on behind the scenes revealed that the British and French seriously doubted their ability to effectively aid the Poles. Take for example discussions held by the British and French Chiefs of Staff between March 31 and April 4, 1939. A report issued at the conclusion of these talks entitled "The Military Implications of an Anglo-French Guarantee of Poland and Rumania" stated
"If Germany undertook a major offensive in the East there is little doubt that she could occupy Rumania, Polish Silesia and the Polish Corridor. If she were to continue the offensive against Poland it would only be a matter of time before Poland was eliminated from the war. Though lack of adequate communications and difficult country would reduce the chances of an early decision. ... No spectacular success against the Siegfried Line can be anticipated, but having regard to the internal situation in Germany, the dispersal of her effort and the strain of her rearmament programme, we should be able to reduce the period of Germany's resistance and we could regard the ultimate issue with confidence."[12]
In short, while the Western Allies anticipated the eventual defeat of Germany they also believed that Germany would crush Poland before turning her forces to the west. This situation did not change substantially in the months leading up to the outbreak of war, despite considerable information that western governments received concerning increasing German military activity. No less credible a source than Robert Coulondre, the French ambassador to Germany, telegraphed numerous warnings to Paris of suspicious German troops movements. For example, on July 13, 1939, Coulondre wrote Georges Bonnet, the French Foreign Minister, that "This Embassy has recently reported to the Ministry numerous signs of abnormal activity in the German army and of Germany's obvious preparations for the possibility of an impending war."[13]
Given what we now know about the months leading up to World War II one cannot help but agree with the conclusion of Polish scholar Anita Prazmowska: "After granting the guarantee to defend Poland, the British (one might add the French -- WFF) failed to develop a concept of an eastern front. ... The result was that the ... guarantee to Poland remained a political bluff devoid of any strategic consequence."[14]
THE FINAL DECEPTIONS: AUGUST 1939
Indeed, Coulondre's warnings were to no avail. By August 1939, with German pressure on Poland increasing daily and a diplomatic solution to the crisis farther away than ever, Allied preparations for war remained minimal at best. Great Britain in particular appeared to be paralyzed by an inability to appreciate the gravity of the situation. Amazingly, the British had developed no coherent plan for offensive operations in the west, either in the air or on land. To make matters worse they also refused requests from Paris to devote air power to support the anticipated French offensive into Germany.[15] And as far as aerial attacks on Germany were concerned, British military planners had actually retreated from their earlier promise to the Poles. By the end of August, thus on the very eve of war, the Chiefs of Staff in London had decided not to attack a wide array of targets in Germany. Rather they would limit aerial bombardment to "military installations and units which were clearly that, to the exclusion of industrial stores and military industrial capacity."[16] Naturally, the Poles were not informed of this alteration in Britain's approach to strategic bombing.
Still the Western Allies continued to put a brave face on their diplomatic efforts to dissuade Germany from going to war with Poland. Considering the relative lack of military preparations, these efforts seem farcical now. For example, on August 15, Robert Coulondre cabled Paris concerning a meeting he'd had with Ernst von Weizsäcker, the State Secretary in the Foreign Ministry in Berlin. During this one-hour conversation Coulondre told von Weizsäcker "if any of the three Allies, France, England, and Poland, were attacked, the other two would automatically be at her side." Furthermore, Coulondre told Paris "To guard as far as possible against this danger [of war] which appears to me formidable and imminent I consider it essential:
(1) To maintain absolute firmness, an entire and unbroken unity of front, as any weakening, or even any semblance of yielding will open the way to war; and to insist every time the opportunity occurs on the automatic operation of military assistance.
(2) To maintain the military forces of the Allies, and in particular our own, on an equality with those of Germany, which are being continuously increased. It is essential that we should at the very least retain the previously existing ratio between our forces and those of the Reich, that we should not give the erroneous impression that we are 'giving ground'."[17]
Again, Coulondre's call for proper military preparations by France would be in vain. Historian Anna Cienciala writes that General Maurice Gamelin, the commander of the French army, "had no intention to implement the French commitments made in the military convention [signed in May 1939]." Incredibly, Gamelin instead took steps to ensure that the Poles would resist the Germans, while not further committing French troops to action. In late August, Gamelin sent General Louis Faury to Warsaw as the head of the French Military Mission there. Prior to departing, Faury "was told that no date could be given [to the Poles] for a French offensive, that the French Army was in no state to attack, and that Poland would have to hold out as best she could. His mission was to see that the Poles would fight. ... [As] General Ironside [had] commented in July, 'the French have lied to the Poles in saying they are going to attack. There is no idea of it'."[18]
The British too had no idea of attacking Germany, although they continued to bluff in the hope that Hitler would back down. The Royal Air Force would not be deployed against German units in support of a French offensive and aerial bombardment in Germany would be limited only to clearly marked military installations (an unworkable proposition, both then and now, even with advanced technology). Yet London continued to issue its own false assurances to Warsaw by signing a formal Agreement of Mutual Assistance between the United Kingdom and Poland on August 25, 1939 that committed Britain to declare war on Germany should she attack Poland.
Finally, in the latter days of August, as war loomed on the horizon and Germany massed more than one million men along the Polish frontier, London and Paris pleaded with Warsaw not to provoke the Germans by fully mobilizing her armed forces. Trusting in their allies, the Poles did as they were asked. Consequently, when the German attack came, the Polish army was only partly mobilized, making it that much easier for the Wehrmacht to split Polish defenses and drive deep behind Polish lines.[19]
CONCLUSION
Thus by September 1, 1939, the pieces were in place for the beginning of a general European war. It would be a war for which Great Britain and France were egregiously unprepared. Meanwhile, Poland would pay in untold lives. France and Great Britain did indeed honor their signatures and declare war on Germany on September 3, 1939. Nevertheless, this proved to be a hollow declaration that provided no help to the Poles. From the evidence presented here is is clear that neither France nor Great Britain had the slightest intention of actually coming to the assistance of their Polish ally.
What transpired is by now well known. The RAF did not even attempt to bomb German military installations because, as the Air Staff concluded on September 20: "Since the immutable aim of the Allies is the ultimate defeat of Germany, without which the fate of Poland is permanently sealed, it would obviously be militarily unsound and to the disadvantage of all, including Poland, to undertake at any given moment operations ... unlikely to achieve effective results, merely for the sake of maintaining a gesture." The Chiefs of Staff agreed, informing 10 Downing Street that "nothing we can do in the air in the Western Theatre would have any effect of relieving pressure on Poland."[20] And so the RAF decided instead to drop propaganda leaflets.
For its part, the French army did launch a diversionary offensive into the Saar region (See the Saar Offensive). German defenses quickly stopped the attack, however, and it was never resumed. In fact, France and Great Britain would never launch an combined offensive during the first year of the war, preferring instead to await the German attack, which came in May 1940 and ended in disastrous defeat for both nations.
The opportunity to fight a brief, localized war against Germany was therefore lost in September 1939. In hindsight, also lost were the opportunities to save millions of lives, to rid the world of Hitler, and to have prevented the creation of conditions that led to the Cold War. As General Ironside commented in 1945, after much of Europe was in ruins, "Militarily we should have gone all out against the German the minute he invaded Poland. ... We did not ... And so we missed the strategical advantage of the Germans being engaged in the East. We thought completely defensively and of ourselves."[21] And so they did.
ENDNOTES
[1] Statement by Prime Minister Chamberlain in House of Commons, March 31, 1939.
Diplomatic correspondence between Georges Bonnet, France's Minister for Foreign Affairs and Léon Nöel, French Ambassador in Warsaw on March 31, 1939 reveals:
"The British Ambassador informed me on March 30 that a question would be put to the British Government next day in the House of Commons, suggesting that a German attack on Poland was imminent and asking what measures the Government would take in such an eventuality.
With the intention of giving the German Government a necessary warning in the least provocative form, the British Government proposed, with the approval of the French Government, to answer that, although it considered such a rumour to be without foundation, it has given the Polish Government an assurance that if, previous to the conclusion of consultations going on with the other Governments, any action were undertaken which clearly threatened the independence of the Polish Government, and which the latter should find itself obliged to resist with armed force, the British and French Governments would immediately lend it all the assistance in their power.
I replied to the communication from Sir Eric Phipps that the French Government would give its whole-hearted approval to the declaration which the British Government proposed to make." See The French Yellow Book: Diplomatic Papers, 1938-1939.
[2] Anglo-Polish Communiqué, April 6, 1939
[3] The Anglo-Polish agreement was also signed on April 6, 1939. See Anita Prazmowska, Britain, Poland and the Eastern Front, 1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 193.
Less than one week later (on April 13, 1939) Edouard Daladier, the French Minister for War and National Defence, issued the following statement to the press:
"The French Government ... derives great satisfaction from the conclusion of the reciprocal undertakings between Great Britain and Poland, who have decided to give each other mutual support in defence of their independence in the event of either being threatened directly or indirectly. The Franco-Polish alliance is, moreover, confirmed in the same spirit by the French Government and the Polish Government. France and Poland guarantee each other immediate and direct aid against any threat direct or indirect, which might aim a blow at their vital interests." Source: The French Yellow Book: Diplomatic Papers, 1938-1939.
[4] Richard Watt, Bitter Glory: Poland and its Fate, 1919-1939 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979), p. 176.
[5] Ruth H. Bauer, "Franco-Polish Relations, 1919-1939" (M.A. Thesis: Georgetown University, 1948), p. 30.
[6] Bauer, "Franco-Polish Relations," p. 32.
[7] Tensions between Germany and Poland arose over the status of the German city of Danzig, which was an independent League of Nations protectorate within northern Poland. Hitler demanded access to Danzig, which had a majority German population, via an extraterritorial highway and rail line from Germany through the Polish Corridor and to East Prussia. Hitler also raged against Poland on the basis of reports that atrocities were being perpetrated by the Poles against the large German minority in the country. This was a tactical maneuver on Hitler's part. Similar claims against the Czechs concerning the German minority in the Sudetenland had won Hitler a significant diplomatic victory at Munich the year before. Although Hitler claimed only to want the status of Danzig settled satisfactorily and the good treatment of Germans in Poland guaranteed, his motives were actually farther reaching. As Hitler made clear on August 11, 1939, during a discussion with Carl Burckhardt at Berchtesgaden (see Carl J. Burckhardt's Meeting with Hitler), his actions were ultimately directed against Soviet Russia and not Poland. Since the Poles had repeatedly rebuffed German invitations to sign the Anti-Comintern Pact, Hitler needed a route by which to reliably transport troops and material to East Prussia, in order to carry out his offensive designs against the USSR. The extraterritorial highway and rail line would have provided this route. Polish refusal to grant Germany this concession thus made war inevitable considering Hitler's broader plans for German expansion to the east (see General Plan East: The Nazi Revolution in German Foreign Policy).
[8] Watt, Bitter Glory, p. 402.
[9] Watt, Bitter Glory, p. 401.
[10] Prazmowska, Britain, Poland and the Eastern Front, pp. 94-95.
[11] Watt, Bitter Glory, p. 408.
[12] Prazmowska, Britain, Poland and the Eastern Front, p. 81.
[13] Coulondre to Bonnet, July 13, 1939
[14] Prazmowska, Britain, Poland and the Eastern Front, p. 105.
[15] Prazmowska, Britain, Poland and the Eastern Front, pp. 182-183.
[16] Prazmowska, Britain, Poland and the Eastern Front, p. 102.
[17] Coulondre to Bonnet, August 15, 1939
[18] Anna M. Cienciala, Poland and the Western Powers, 1938-1939 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968), p. 245.
[19] Cienciala, Poland and the Western Powers, p. 248.
[20] Prazmowska, Britain, Poland and the Eastern Front, pp. 183-184.
[21] Cienciala, Poland and the Western Powers, p. 249.

Poland USA 2010

Monday, January 28, 2008

Świetny film o Polsce , oby takich więcej.

Prof. Jerzy Robert Nowak – Historian, Writer, Publicist in Washington DC Wednesday, January 30, 2008 at 7:30 p.m.

Wednesday, January 23, 2008

Break into the Enigma systems that were to be used by Nazi Germany was made in Poland in 1932

Polish military plane CASA (made in Spain) with 10 on board crashes today.

Tuesday, January 22, 2008

With dollar's decline, Poles head to US to spend

Sunday, January 20, 2008

America views Poland "as a playground rather than a player.

America views Poland "as a playground rather than a player.

Poland became the latest of several Western and Arab countries to pledge military aid to Lebanon

Wednesday, January 16, 2008

Polacy pomagaja Stanom Zjednoczonych USA

Sunday, January 13, 2008

Half of These Holocaust Victims Were Non-Jewish.

Friday, January 11, 2008

Anna Jantar - Nic Nie Może Wiecznie Trwać

Prezydent USA na bliskim wschodzie, sprawa tarczy antyrakietowej

Wednesday, January 9, 2008

Decyzje min. Sikorskiego

Sunday, January 6, 2008

Marek Grechuta - Ojczyzna

Świetny film o Polsce , oby takich więcej

THE FRENCH AND BRITISH BETRAYAL OF POLAND IN 1939

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