Polish Pilots of the World WarII
"Polish Soldier fights for the freedom of other nations but dies only for Poland."
- Gen.Stanislaw Maczek
Invasion:
On September 1st., 1939, 1.8 million German troops invaded Poland on three fronts; East Prussia in the north, Germany in the west and Slovakia in the south. They had 2600 tanks against the Polish 180, and over 2000 aircraft against the Polish 420. Their "Blitzkrieg" tactics, coupled with their bombing of defenceless towns and refugees, had never been seen before and, at first, caught the Poles off-guard. By September 14th. Warsaw was surrounded. At this stage the poles reacted, holding off the Germans at Kutno and regrouping behind the Wisla (Vistula) and Bzura rivers. Although Britain and France declared war on September 3rd. the Poles received no help - yet it had been agreed that the Poles should fight a defensive campaign for only 2 weeks during which time the Allies could get their forces together and attack from the west.
There are many "myths" that surround the September Campaign; the fictional Polish cavalry charges against German tanks (actually reported by the Italian press and used as propaganda by the Germans), the alleged destruction of the Polish Air Force on the ground, or claims that Polish armour failed to achieve any success against the invaders. In reality, and despite the fact that Poland was only just beginning to modernise her armed forces and had been forced (by Britain and France) to delay mobilisation (which they claimed might be interpreted as aggressive behaviour) so that, at the time of invasion, only about one-third of her total potential manpower was mobilised, Polish forces ensured that the September campaign was no "walk-over". The Wehrmacht had so under-rated Polish anti-tank capabilities (the Polish-designed anti-tank gun was one of the best in the world at that time) that they had gone into action with white "balkankreuz", or crosses, prominently displayed in eight locations; these crosses made excellent aiming points for Polish gun-sights and forced the Germans to radically rethink their national insignia, initially overpainting them in yellow and then, for their later campaigns, adopting the modified "balkankreuz" similar to that used by the Luftwaffe. The recently-designed 7TP "czolg lekki", or light tank, the first in the world to be designed with a diesel engine, proved to be superior to German tanks of the same class (the PzKpfw I and II) inflicting serious damage to the German forces, limited only by the fact that they were not used in concentrated groups. They were absorbed by the Germans into their own Panzer divisions at the end of the campaign.
On September 17th. Soviet forces invaded from the east. Warsaw surrendered 2 weeks later, the garrison on the Hel peninsula surrendered on October 2nd., and the Polesie Defence group, after fighting on two fronts against both German and Soviet forces, surrendered on October 5th. The Poles had held on for twice as long as had been expected and had done more damage to the Germans than the combined British and French forces were to do in 1940. The Germans lost 50,000 men, 697 planes and 993 tanks and armoured cars.
Thousands of soldiers and civilians managed to escape to France and Britain whilst many more went "underground" . A government-in-exile was formed with Wladyslaw Raczkiewicz as President and General Wladyslaw Sikorski as Prime Minister.
The Fourth Partition:
Under the German-Soviet pact Poland was divided; the Soviets took, and absorbed into the Soviet Union, the eastern half (Byelorussia and the West Ukraine), the Germans incorporated Pomerania, Posnania and Silesia into the Reich whilst the rest was designated as the General-Gouvernement (a colony ruled from Krakow by Hitler's friend, Hans Frank).
In the Soviet zone 1.5 million Poles (including women and children) were transported to labour camps in Siberia and other areas. Many thousands of captured Polish officers were shot at several secret forest sites; the first to be discovered being Katyn, near Smolensk.
The Germans declared their intention of eliminating the Polish race (a task to be completed by 1975) alongside the Jews. This process of elimination, the "Holocaust", was carried out systematically. All members of the "intelligentsia" were hunted down in order to destroy Polish culture and leadership (many were originally exterminated at Oswiencim - better known by its German name, Auschwitz). Secret universities and schools, a "Cultural Underground", were formed (the penalty for belonging to one was death). In the General-Gouvernement there were about 100,000 secondary school pupils and over 10,000 university students involved in secret education.
The Polish Jews were herded into Ghettos where they were slowly starved and cruelly offered hopes of survival but, in fact, ended up being shot or gassed. In the end they were transported, alongside non-Jewish Poles, Gypsies and Soviet POWs, to extermination camps such as Auschwitz and Treblinka; at Auschwitz over 4 million were exterminated. 2000 concentration camps were built in Poland, which became the major site of the extermination programme, since this was where most of the intended victims lived.
Many non-Jewish Poles were either transported to Germany and used as slave labour or simply executed. In the cities the Germans would round-up and kill indiscriminately as a punishment for any underground or anti-German or pro-Jewish activity. In the countryside they kept prominent citizens as hostages who would be executed if necessary. Sometimes they liquidated whole villages; at least 300 villages were destroyed. Hans Frank said, "If I wanted to put up a poster for every seven Poles shot, the forests of Poland would not suffice to produce the paper for such posters."
Despite such horror the Poles refused to give in or cooperate (there were no Polish collaborators as in other occupied countries). The Polish Underground or AK (Armia Krajowa or Home Army) was the largest in Europe with 400,000 men. The Jewish resistance movement was set up separately because of the problem of being imprisoned within the ghettos. Both these organisations caused great damage to the Nazi military machine. Many non-Jewish Poles saved the lives of thousands of Jews despite the fact that the penalty, if caught, was death (in fact, Poland was the only occupied nation where aiding Jews was punishable by death).
Fighting on all Fronts:
The Polish Army, Navy and Air Force reorganised abroad and continued to fight the Germans. In fact they have the distinction of being the only nation to fight on every front in the War. In 1940 they fought in France, in the Norwegian campaign they earned a reputation for bravery at Narvik, and in Africa the Carpathian Brigade fought at Tobruk.
Polish Squadrons played an important role in the Battle of Britain, accounting for 12% of all German aircraft destroyed at the cost of 33 lives. By the end of the war they had flown a total of 86,527 sorties, lost 1669 men and shot down 500 German planes and 190 V1 rockets.
The Polish Navy, which had escaped intact, consisted of 60 vessels, including 2 cruisers, 9 destroyers and 5 submarines ( one of which was the famous "Orzel") which were involved in 665 actions at sea. The first German ship sunk in the war was sunk by Polish ships. The Navy also took part in the D-Day landings.
When the Soviet Union was attacked by Germany, in June 1941, Polish POWs were released from prison camps and set up an army headed by General Anders. Many civilians were taken under the protection of this army which was allowed to make its way to Persia (modern-day Iran) and then on to Egypt. This army, the Polish Second Corps, fought with distinction in Italy, their most notable victory being that at Monte Cassino, in May 1944, and which opened up the road to Rome for the Allies as a whole. One of the "heroes" of the Polish Second Corps was Wojtek, a brown bear adopted in Iran as their mascot; at Monte Cassino Wojtek actually helped in the fighting by carrying ammunition for the guns. He died, famous and well-loved, in Edinburgh Zoo in 1964, aged 22.
All the Polish forces took part in the Allied invasion of Europe and liberation of France, playing a particularly crucial role in the significant Battle of the Falaise Gap. The Polish Parachute Brigade took part in the disastrous Battle of Arnhem in Holland. In 1945, the Poles captured the German port of Wilhelmshaven.
In 1943 a division of Polish soldiers was formed in Russia under Soviet control and fought on the Eastern Front. They fought loyally alongside the Soviet troops, despite the suffering they had experienced in Soviet hands, and they distinguished themselves in breaking through the last German lines of defence, the "Pomeranian Rampart", in the fighting in Saxony and in the capture of Berlin.
The "Home Army", under the command of General Stefan Roweki (code-named "Grot"), and after his capture in 1943 (he was later murdered), by General Tadeusz Komorowski (code-named "Bor"), fought a very varied war; at times in open combat in brigade or division strength, at times involved in sabotage, often acting as execution squads eliminating German officials, and often fighting a psychological campaign against German military and civilians. It was a costly war since the Germans always took reprisals.
The Intelligence Service of the Home Army captured and sent parts of the V1 to London for examination, providing information on German military movements (giving advanced warning of the German plan to invade Russia), and gave the RAF full information about Peenemunde, where the Germans were producing V2 rockets.
Betrayal:
The crime of Katyn was discovered in 1943 and created a rift in Polish-Soviet relations. From now on the Home Army was attacked by Soviet propaganda as collaborating with the Germans and being called on to rise against the Germans once the Red Army reached the outskirts of Warsaw.
Secretly, at Teheran, the British and Americans agreed to letting the Russians profit from their invasion of Poland in 1939 and allowing them to keep the lands that had been absorbed. The "accidental" death of General Sikorski at this time helped keep protests at a minimum.
When the Russians crossed into Poland the Home Army cooperated in the fight against the Germans and contributed greatly to the victories at Lwow, Wilno and Lublin only to find themselves surrounded and disarmed by their "comrades-in-arms" and deported to labour camps in Siberia.
On August 1, 1944, with the Russian forces on the right bank of the Vistula, the Home Army rose in Warsaw; the Warsaw Rising. Heroic street-fighting involving the whole population, using the sewers as lines of communication and escape, under heavy bombardment, lasted for 63 days. The city was completely destroyed. Not only did the Russians cease to advance but they also refused to allow Allied planes to land on Russian airfields after dropping supplies. After surrendering many civilians and soldiers were executed or sent to concentration camps to be exterminated and Warsaw was razed to the ground.
The defeat in Warsaw destroyed the political and military institutions of the Polish underground and left the way open for a Soviet take-over.
With the liberation of Lublin in July 1944 a Russian-sponsored Polish Committee for National Liberation (a Communist Government in all but name) had been set up and the British had put great pressure, mostly unsuccessful, on the Government-in-exile to accept this status quo. At Yalta, in February 1945, the Allies put Poland within the Russian zone of influence in a post-war Europe. To most Poles the meaning of these two events was perfectly clear; Poland had been betrayed. At one stage the Polish Army, still fighting in Italy and Germany, was prepared to withdraw from the front lines in protest; after all, they were supposed to be fighting for Polish liberation. It is a reflection on Polish honour that no such withdrawal took place since it could leave large gaps in the front lines and so was considered too dangerous for their Allied comrades-in-arms.
The war ended on May 8th, 1945.
The Cost:
The Poles are the people who really lost the war.
Over half a million fighting men and women, and 6 million civilians (or 22% of the total population) died. About 50% of these were Polish Christians and 50% were Polish Jews. Approximately 5,384,000, or 89.9% of Polish war losses (Jews and Gentiles) were the victims of prisons, death camps, raids, executions, annihilation of ghettos, epidemics, starvation, excessive work and ill treatment. So many Poles were sent to concentration camps that virtually every family had someone close to them who had been tortured or murdered there.
There were one million war orphans and over half a million invalids.
The country lost 38% of its national assets (Britain lost 0.8%, France lost 1.5%). Half the country was swallowed up by the Soviet Union including the two great cultural centres of Lwow and Wilno.
Many Poles could not return to the country for which they has fought because they belonged to the "wrong" political group or came from eastern Poland and had thus become Soviet citizens. Others were arrested, tortured and imprisoned by the Soviet authorities for belonging to the Home Army.
Although "victors" they were not allowed to partake in victory celebrations.
Through fighting "For Our Freedom and Yours" they had exchanged one master
Sunday, January 6, 2008
Sunday, December 30, 2007
Saturday, December 22, 2007
John Mearsheimer - Iraq, the Neocons and the Israel Lobby
John Mearsheimer - Iraq, the Neocons and the Israel Lobby
R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor
University of Chicago
Co-director, Program on International Security Policy
University of Chicago
E-mail: j-mearsheimer@uchicago.edu
Office Address:
Political Science Department
University of Chicago
5828 S. University Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
Office Numbers:
Office Phone: 773-702-8667
Office FAX: 773-702-1689
Education:
Ph.D. (Government), Cornell University, 1981
M.A. (Government), Cornell University, 1978
M.A. (International Relations), University of Southern California, 1974
B.S. West Point, 1970
Honors:
"Remains of Education" Address to Class of 2005, University of Chicago, June 10, 2005
E.H. Carr Memorial Lecture, Aberystwyth, UK, October 14, 2004
Graduation Speaker, University of Chicago, June 11-12, 2004
Distinguished Scholar Award, International Studies Association (ISA), March 18, 2004
The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, recipient of Joseph Lepgold Book Prize
Conventional Deterrence, recipient of Edgar S. Furniss, Jr. Book Award
S. Rajaratnam Professorship in Strategic Studies, IDSS, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, 2004
Member, American Academy of Arts and Sciences
Whitney H. Shepardson Fellowship, Council on Foreign Relations, 1998-1999
"Aims of Education" Address to Class of 2001, University of Chicago, September 21, 1997
Quantrell Award for Distinguished Teaching, University of Chicago, 1985
Clark Award for Distinguished Teaching, Cornell University, 1977
PhD dissertation, honorable mention for APSA's 1980 81 Helen Dwight Reid Award
Phi Beta Kappa Visiting Scholar, 1993-1994
George Kistiakowsky Scholar, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1986-1987
Academic Positions:
1975-1979, Graduate Student, Cornell University
1979-1980, Research Fellow, Brookings Institution
1980-1982, Research Associate, CFIA, Harvard University
1982-Present, member, Political Science Department, University of Chicago [Assistant Prof., 1982-1984; Associate Prof., 1984-1987; Professor, 1987-1995; Harrison Chair, 1996-Present; Department Chair, 1989-1992.]
1992-1993, Visiting Scholar, Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University
Books:
John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007). Translated into Arabic, Catalan, Danish, Dutch, French, German, Greek, Italian, Japanese, and Spanish.
John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001). Translated into Chinese, Greek, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Portuguese, Romanian, and Serbian.
John J. Mearsheimer, Liddell Hart and the Weight of History (New York: Cornell University Press; London: Brassey's, 1988).
John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (New York: Cornell University Press, 1983).
Russell Hardin, John J. Mearsheimer, Robert E. Goodin, Gerald Dworkin, eds. Nuclear Deterrence: Ethics and Strategy (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1985)
Articles and Book Chapters:
John J. Mearsheimer, "Structural Realism," in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, eds., International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 71-88.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Forward," in Naoto Yoshikawa and Kazuhiko Noguchi, Perspectives on International Relations (Tokyo: Keiso Text Selection, 2006), pp. i-vi.
John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "The Israel Lobby," London Review of Books, Vol. 28, No. 6 (March 23, 2006), pp. 3-12. Reprinted in numerous places. Also see John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "Letters: The Israel Lobby," London Review of Books, Vol. 28, No. 9 (May 11, 2006), pp. 4-5.
John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy," Faculty Research Working Paper No. RWP06-011, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, March 13, 2006. For a revised, updated, and unabridged version, see John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy," Middle East Policy, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Fall 2006), pp. 1-59.
John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "The War over Israel's Influence," Foreign Policy, No. 155 (July/August 2006), pp. 57-58, 64-66.
John J. Mearsheimer, "China's Unpeaceful Rise," Current History, Vol. 105, No. 690 (April 2006), pp. 160-162.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Conversations in International Relations - Interview with John J. Mearsheimer (Part II)," International Relations, Vol. 20, No. 2 (2006), pp. 231-243.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Conversations in International Relations - Interview with John J. Mearsheimer (Part I)," International Relations, Vol. 20, No. 1 (2006), pp. 105-124.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Zu Diesem Buch," in Carlo Masala, Kenneth N. Waltz: Einführung in seine Theorie und Auseinandersetzung mit seinen Kritikern (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005).
John J. Mearsheimer, "Hans Morgenthau and the Iraq War: Realism versus Neo-Conservatism," opendemocracy.com, posted May 19, 2005. Excerpted as "Realism is Right," in The National Interest, No. 81 (Fall 2005), p. 10. Also published as "Hans Morgenthau und der Irakkrieg: Realismus versus Neokonservatismus," in Merkur, Vol. 59, No. 677/678 (September-October 2005), pp. 836-844. Also published as "A Case Study of Iraq - Analogies to Vietnam?" in Christian Hacke, Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, and Kai M. Schellhorn, eds., The Heritage, Challenge, and Future of Realism (Gottingen: V&R Unipress, 2005), pp. 139-148.
John J. Mearsheimer, "The Mores Isms the Better," International Relations, Vol. 19, No. 3 (September 2005), pp. 354-359. [My response to five pieces responding to my "E.H. Carr vs. Idealism" piece]
John J. Mearsheimer, "E.H. Carr vs. Idealism: The Battle Rages On," International Relations, Vol. 19, No. 2 (June 2005), pp. 139-152.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Clash of the Titans," A Debate with Zbigniew Brzezinski on the Rise of China, Foreign Policy, No. 146 (January-February 2005), pp. 46-49.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Real World," letter published in the New Republic, August 9, 2004, p. 4.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Power and Fear in Great Power Politics," in G.O. Mazur, ed., One Hundred Year Commemoration to the Life of Hans Morgenthau (1904-2004) (New York: Semenenko Foundation, 2004), pp. 184-196.
John J. Mearsheimer, "A Self-Enclosed World?" in Ian Shapiro, Rogers M. Smith, and Tarek E. Masoud, eds., Problems and Methods in the Study of Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 388-394.
John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "An Unnecessary War," Foreign Policy, No. 134 (January-February, 2003), pp. 50-59. Reprinted in Australian Financial Review, Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung (Germany), Prospect (UK), Gazeta Wyborcza (Poland), Magyar Narancs (Hungary), Foreign Policy-Arabic Edition, Foreign Policy-Turkish Edition, Gestion (Ecuador), Opposing Viewpoints: Middle East (Gale Group); and in Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, eds., The Iraq Reader: History, Documents, Opinions (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2003), pp. 414-424.
John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "Can Saddam Be Contained? History Says Yes," (Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, November 12, 2002).
John J. Mearsheimer, "Hearts and Minds," The National Interest, No. 69 (Fall 2002), pp. 13-16.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Realism, the Real World, and the Academy," in Michael Brecher and Frank P. Harvey, eds., Realism and Institutionalism in International Studies (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2002), pp. 23-33.
John J. Mearsheimer, "The Future of the American Pacifier," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 5 (September/October, 2001), pp. 46-61.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Kissinger's Wisdom ... and Advice," The National Interest, No. 65 (Fall 2001), pp. 123-129.
John J. Mearsheimer, "The Case for Partitioning Kosovo," in Ted Galen Carpenter, ed., NATO's Empty Victory: A Postmortem on the Balkan War (Washington, DC: CATO Institute, 2000), pp. 133-138.
John J. Mearsheimer, "The Aims of Education," and "Teaching Morality at the Margins," in Philosophy and Literature, Vol. 22, No. 1 (April 1998), pp. 137-155, 193-198.
John J. Mearsheimer, "The Future of America's Continental Commitment," in Geir Lundestad, ed., No End To Alliance: The United States and Western Europe (New York: St. Martin's, 1998), pp. 221-242.
John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera, "When Peace Means War," New Republic, December 18, 1995, pp. 16-21.
John J. Mearsheimer, "A Realist Reply," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 82-93. [My response to four pieces responding to my "False Promise" piece]
John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/1995), pp. 5-49. Reprinted in Michael E. Brown et al., eds., The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), pp. 332-376; Michael E. Brown et al., eds., Theories of War and Peace: An International Security Reader (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 329-383; Karen Mingst and Jack Snyder, eds., Essential Readings in World Politics (New York: Norton, 2000); Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 7th ed, revised by Kenneth W. Thompson and W. David Clinton (New York: McGraw Hill, pp. 569-585. Originally published as Working Paper No. 10 for the Project on the Changing Security Environment and American National Interests, John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University, November 1994.
John J. Mearsheimer, "McNamara's War," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 49, No. 6 (June/July 1993). Review of Deborah Shapley, Promise and Power: The Life and Times of Robert McNamara (New York: Little, Brown, 1993).
John J. Mearsheimer, "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 50-66.
John J. Mearsheimer and Robert A. Pape, "The Answer: A Three-Way Partition Plan for Bosnia And How the U.S. Can Enforce It," The New Republic, June 14, 1993, pp. 22-28.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Disorder Restored," in Graham Allison and Gregory Treverton, eds., Rethinking America's Security: Beyond Cold War to New World Order (New York: Norton, 1992), pp. 213-237.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56. Reprinted in Sean M. Lynn-Jones, ed., The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991), pp. 141-192; Michael E. Brown et al., eds., The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), pp. 78-129. and Michael E. Brown et al., eds., Theories of War and Peace: An International Security Reader (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 3-54.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Correspondence: Back to the Future, Part III: Realism and the Realities of European Security," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/1991), pp. 219-222.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Correspondence: Back to the Future, Part II: International Relations Theory and Post-Cold War Europe," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Fall 1990), pp. 194-199.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War," The Atlantic, August 1990, pp. 35-50. Reprinted in numerous places. Also see "Letters to the Editor: The Cold War Reconsidered," The Atlantic, November 1990, pp. 8-16.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Assessing the Conventional Balance: The 3:1 Rule and Its Critics," International Security, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Spring 1989), pp. 54-89.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Correspondence: Reassessing Net Assessment," International Security, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Spring 1989), pp. 128-144.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Numbers, Strategy, and the European Balance," International Security, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 174-185.
John J. Mearsheimer, "A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe," International Security, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Fall 1986), pp. 3 57. Reprinted in Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, eds., The Use of Force, 3rd ed. (New York: University Press of America, 1988), pp. 590-617; and Steven E. Miller and Stephen Van Evera, eds., Naval Strategy and National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 47-101.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Prospects for Conventional Deterrence in Europe," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 41, No. 7 (August 1985), pp. 158 162. Reprinted in Len Ackland and Steven McGuire, eds., Assessing the Nuclear Age (Chicago: Education Foundation for Nuclear Science, 1986), pp. 335-343.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in Europe," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Winter 1984/1985), pp. 19 46. Reprinted in Hylke Tromp, ed., War in Europe (Aldershot, Eng.: Avebury, 1989), pp. 71-100.
John J. Mearsheimer, "War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495-1975," Journal of Modern History, Vol. 56, No. 4 (December 1984), pp. 710-711. Review essay of Jack S. Levy, War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495-1975 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983).
John J. Mearsheimer, "The Military Reform Movement: A Critical Assessment," ORBIS, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Summer 1983), pp. 285-300.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe," International Security, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Summer 1982), pp. 3 39. Reprinted in Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, eds., The Use of Force, 3rd ed. (New York: University Press of America, 1988), pp. 442-463; and Steven E. Miller, ed., Conventional Forces and American Defense Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 121-157.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Maneuver, Mobile Defense and the NATO Central Front," International Security, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Winter 1981/1982), pp. 104 122. Reprinted in Steven E. Miller, ed., Conventional Forces and American Defense Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 231-249.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Correspondence" [regarding the "British Generals Talk"], International Security, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Winter 1981/82), pp. 227 229.
John J. Mearsheimer, "The British Generals Talk," International Security, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Summer 1981), pp. 165 184.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Rejoinder" in "Debate on Precision guided Munitions," Survival, Vol. XXII, No. 1 (January February 1980), pp. 20 22.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Precision guided Munitions and Conventional Deterrence," Survival, Vol. XXI, No. 2 (March April 1979), pp. 68 76.
Op-Ed Pieces:
John J. Mearsheimer, "The Rise of China Will Not Be Peaceful at All," The Australian, November 18, 2005.
John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "Keeping Saddam Hussein in a Box," New York Times, February 2, 2003.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Guns Won't Win the Afghan War," New York Times, November 4, 2001.
John J. Mearsheimer et al., "War with Iraq Is Not in America's National Interest," New York Times paid advertisement, September 26, 2002.
John J. Mearsheimer, "The Impossible Partition," New York Times, January 11, 2001.
John J. Mearsheimer, "India Needs The Bomb," New York Times, March 24, 2000.
John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera, "Redraw the Map, Stop the Killing," New York Times, April 19, 1999.
John J. Mearsheimer, "A Peace Agreement That's Bound To Fail," New York Times, October 19, 1998.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Here We Go Again," New York Times, May 17, 1998.
John J. Mearsheimer, "The Only Exit From Bosnia," New York Times, October 7, 1997.
John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera, "Hateful Neighbors," New York Times, September 24, 1996.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Shrink Bosnia to Save It," New York Times, March 31, 1993.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Will Iraq Fight or Fold Its Tent? Liberation in Less Than a Week," New York Times, February 8, 1991.
John J. Mearsheimer, "A War the U.S. Can Win - Decisively," Chicago Tribune, January 15, 1991.
Work Experience:
July 1981 July 1982, Executive Secretary, Strategy and Arms Control Seminar, Harvard University.
May 1978 August 1978, Internship at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), Washington, D.C.
June 1970 August 1975, Officer, U.S. Air Force.
June 1965 July 1966, Enlisted Man, U.S. Army.
Other:
Member, Advisory Committee, National Interest.
Member, Board of Advisors of Foreign Affairs.
Member, Editorial Board, International Security.
Member, Editorial Board, Security Studies.
Member, Editorial Board, International History Review, 1997-2000.
Member, Editorial Board, JFQ: Joint Forces Quarterly.
Member, Editorial Board, Journal of Transatlantic Studies.
Member, Editorial Board, Asian Security.
Member, Editorial Board, China Security.
Member, International Editorial Committee, International Relations.
Member, Council on Foreign Relations (New York).
Member, Chicago Council on Global Affairs.
Member, International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Member, Visiting Committee of MIT Political Science Department, 2004-2008.
Member, International Academic Advisory Board, BESA Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, Israel, 1993-2006.
Member, Board of Advisors, Center on Peace and Liberty, Independent Institute.
Consultant, RAND Corporation, 1985-1986.
Secretary-Treasurer, Inter University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, 1985-1987.
Senior Fellow, John M. Olin Center for Inquiry Into the Theory and Practice of Democracy, University of Chicago.
Testified before Senate Foreign Relations Committee on October 3, 1985. See U.S. Congress, SFRC, A NATO Strategy for the 1990's, Part 5, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., October 3, 1985.
Testified before Senate Armed Services Committee on October 20, 1987. See U.S. Congress, SASC, Alliance and Defense Capabilities in Europe, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., October 20, 1987. Also reprinted in John T. Rourke, Taking Sides: Clashing Views on Controversial Issues in World Politics, 2nd ed. (Guilford, Ct.: Dushkin, 1989), pp. 224-230.
Section Chairperson for "National Security Policy" for the 1987 American Political Science Association Convention.
Member, Chicago Study Group on U.S. National Interests after the Cold War (Sponsored by Council on Foreign Relations), 1996.
Member, James Madison Award Selection Committee, American Political Science Association, 1999.
Member, Helen Dwight Reid Award Selection Committee, American Political Science Association, 2006.
Co-chair (with John L. Gaddis) of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences' "Committee on History, the Social Sciences and International Security Affairs," 1987-1990.
Associate member of the London School of Economics’ "Cold War Studies Centre" (CWSC).
Member, Selection Committee for President of the University of Chicago, 2005-2006.
Updated: August 09, 2007
R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor
University of Chicago
Co-director, Program on International Security Policy
University of Chicago
E-mail: j-mearsheimer@uchicago.edu
Office Address:
Political Science Department
University of Chicago
5828 S. University Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
Office Numbers:
Office Phone: 773-702-8667
Office FAX: 773-702-1689
Education:
Ph.D. (Government), Cornell University, 1981
M.A. (Government), Cornell University, 1978
M.A. (International Relations), University of Southern California, 1974
B.S. West Point, 1970
Honors:
"Remains of Education" Address to Class of 2005, University of Chicago, June 10, 2005
E.H. Carr Memorial Lecture, Aberystwyth, UK, October 14, 2004
Graduation Speaker, University of Chicago, June 11-12, 2004
Distinguished Scholar Award, International Studies Association (ISA), March 18, 2004
The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, recipient of Joseph Lepgold Book Prize
Conventional Deterrence, recipient of Edgar S. Furniss, Jr. Book Award
S. Rajaratnam Professorship in Strategic Studies, IDSS, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, 2004
Member, American Academy of Arts and Sciences
Whitney H. Shepardson Fellowship, Council on Foreign Relations, 1998-1999
"Aims of Education" Address to Class of 2001, University of Chicago, September 21, 1997
Quantrell Award for Distinguished Teaching, University of Chicago, 1985
Clark Award for Distinguished Teaching, Cornell University, 1977
PhD dissertation, honorable mention for APSA's 1980 81 Helen Dwight Reid Award
Phi Beta Kappa Visiting Scholar, 1993-1994
George Kistiakowsky Scholar, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1986-1987
Academic Positions:
1975-1979, Graduate Student, Cornell University
1979-1980, Research Fellow, Brookings Institution
1980-1982, Research Associate, CFIA, Harvard University
1982-Present, member, Political Science Department, University of Chicago [Assistant Prof., 1982-1984; Associate Prof., 1984-1987; Professor, 1987-1995; Harrison Chair, 1996-Present; Department Chair, 1989-1992.]
1992-1993, Visiting Scholar, Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University
Books:
John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007). Translated into Arabic, Catalan, Danish, Dutch, French, German, Greek, Italian, Japanese, and Spanish.
John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001). Translated into Chinese, Greek, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Portuguese, Romanian, and Serbian.
John J. Mearsheimer, Liddell Hart and the Weight of History (New York: Cornell University Press; London: Brassey's, 1988).
John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (New York: Cornell University Press, 1983).
Russell Hardin, John J. Mearsheimer, Robert E. Goodin, Gerald Dworkin, eds. Nuclear Deterrence: Ethics and Strategy (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1985)
Articles and Book Chapters:
John J. Mearsheimer, "Structural Realism," in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, eds., International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 71-88.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Forward," in Naoto Yoshikawa and Kazuhiko Noguchi, Perspectives on International Relations (Tokyo: Keiso Text Selection, 2006), pp. i-vi.
John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "The Israel Lobby," London Review of Books, Vol. 28, No. 6 (March 23, 2006), pp. 3-12. Reprinted in numerous places. Also see John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "Letters: The Israel Lobby," London Review of Books, Vol. 28, No. 9 (May 11, 2006), pp. 4-5.
John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy," Faculty Research Working Paper No. RWP06-011, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, March 13, 2006. For a revised, updated, and unabridged version, see John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy," Middle East Policy, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Fall 2006), pp. 1-59.
John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "The War over Israel's Influence," Foreign Policy, No. 155 (July/August 2006), pp. 57-58, 64-66.
John J. Mearsheimer, "China's Unpeaceful Rise," Current History, Vol. 105, No. 690 (April 2006), pp. 160-162.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Conversations in International Relations - Interview with John J. Mearsheimer (Part II)," International Relations, Vol. 20, No. 2 (2006), pp. 231-243.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Conversations in International Relations - Interview with John J. Mearsheimer (Part I)," International Relations, Vol. 20, No. 1 (2006), pp. 105-124.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Zu Diesem Buch," in Carlo Masala, Kenneth N. Waltz: Einführung in seine Theorie und Auseinandersetzung mit seinen Kritikern (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005).
John J. Mearsheimer, "Hans Morgenthau and the Iraq War: Realism versus Neo-Conservatism," opendemocracy.com, posted May 19, 2005. Excerpted as "Realism is Right," in The National Interest, No. 81 (Fall 2005), p. 10. Also published as "Hans Morgenthau und der Irakkrieg: Realismus versus Neokonservatismus," in Merkur, Vol. 59, No. 677/678 (September-October 2005), pp. 836-844. Also published as "A Case Study of Iraq - Analogies to Vietnam?" in Christian Hacke, Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, and Kai M. Schellhorn, eds., The Heritage, Challenge, and Future of Realism (Gottingen: V&R Unipress, 2005), pp. 139-148.
John J. Mearsheimer, "The Mores Isms the Better," International Relations, Vol. 19, No. 3 (September 2005), pp. 354-359. [My response to five pieces responding to my "E.H. Carr vs. Idealism" piece]
John J. Mearsheimer, "E.H. Carr vs. Idealism: The Battle Rages On," International Relations, Vol. 19, No. 2 (June 2005), pp. 139-152.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Clash of the Titans," A Debate with Zbigniew Brzezinski on the Rise of China, Foreign Policy, No. 146 (January-February 2005), pp. 46-49.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Real World," letter published in the New Republic, August 9, 2004, p. 4.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Power and Fear in Great Power Politics," in G.O. Mazur, ed., One Hundred Year Commemoration to the Life of Hans Morgenthau (1904-2004) (New York: Semenenko Foundation, 2004), pp. 184-196.
John J. Mearsheimer, "A Self-Enclosed World?" in Ian Shapiro, Rogers M. Smith, and Tarek E. Masoud, eds., Problems and Methods in the Study of Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 388-394.
John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "An Unnecessary War," Foreign Policy, No. 134 (January-February, 2003), pp. 50-59. Reprinted in Australian Financial Review, Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung (Germany), Prospect (UK), Gazeta Wyborcza (Poland), Magyar Narancs (Hungary), Foreign Policy-Arabic Edition, Foreign Policy-Turkish Edition, Gestion (Ecuador), Opposing Viewpoints: Middle East (Gale Group); and in Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, eds., The Iraq Reader: History, Documents, Opinions (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2003), pp. 414-424.
John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "Can Saddam Be Contained? History Says Yes," (Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, November 12, 2002).
John J. Mearsheimer, "Hearts and Minds," The National Interest, No. 69 (Fall 2002), pp. 13-16.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Realism, the Real World, and the Academy," in Michael Brecher and Frank P. Harvey, eds., Realism and Institutionalism in International Studies (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2002), pp. 23-33.
John J. Mearsheimer, "The Future of the American Pacifier," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 5 (September/October, 2001), pp. 46-61.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Kissinger's Wisdom ... and Advice," The National Interest, No. 65 (Fall 2001), pp. 123-129.
John J. Mearsheimer, "The Case for Partitioning Kosovo," in Ted Galen Carpenter, ed., NATO's Empty Victory: A Postmortem on the Balkan War (Washington, DC: CATO Institute, 2000), pp. 133-138.
John J. Mearsheimer, "The Aims of Education," and "Teaching Morality at the Margins," in Philosophy and Literature, Vol. 22, No. 1 (April 1998), pp. 137-155, 193-198.
John J. Mearsheimer, "The Future of America's Continental Commitment," in Geir Lundestad, ed., No End To Alliance: The United States and Western Europe (New York: St. Martin's, 1998), pp. 221-242.
John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera, "When Peace Means War," New Republic, December 18, 1995, pp. 16-21.
John J. Mearsheimer, "A Realist Reply," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 82-93. [My response to four pieces responding to my "False Promise" piece]
John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/1995), pp. 5-49. Reprinted in Michael E. Brown et al., eds., The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), pp. 332-376; Michael E. Brown et al., eds., Theories of War and Peace: An International Security Reader (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 329-383; Karen Mingst and Jack Snyder, eds., Essential Readings in World Politics (New York: Norton, 2000); Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 7th ed, revised by Kenneth W. Thompson and W. David Clinton (New York: McGraw Hill, pp. 569-585. Originally published as Working Paper No. 10 for the Project on the Changing Security Environment and American National Interests, John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University, November 1994.
John J. Mearsheimer, "McNamara's War," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 49, No. 6 (June/July 1993). Review of Deborah Shapley, Promise and Power: The Life and Times of Robert McNamara (New York: Little, Brown, 1993).
John J. Mearsheimer, "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 50-66.
John J. Mearsheimer and Robert A. Pape, "The Answer: A Three-Way Partition Plan for Bosnia And How the U.S. Can Enforce It," The New Republic, June 14, 1993, pp. 22-28.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Disorder Restored," in Graham Allison and Gregory Treverton, eds., Rethinking America's Security: Beyond Cold War to New World Order (New York: Norton, 1992), pp. 213-237.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56. Reprinted in Sean M. Lynn-Jones, ed., The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991), pp. 141-192; Michael E. Brown et al., eds., The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), pp. 78-129. and Michael E. Brown et al., eds., Theories of War and Peace: An International Security Reader (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 3-54.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Correspondence: Back to the Future, Part III: Realism and the Realities of European Security," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/1991), pp. 219-222.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Correspondence: Back to the Future, Part II: International Relations Theory and Post-Cold War Europe," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Fall 1990), pp. 194-199.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War," The Atlantic, August 1990, pp. 35-50. Reprinted in numerous places. Also see "Letters to the Editor: The Cold War Reconsidered," The Atlantic, November 1990, pp. 8-16.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Assessing the Conventional Balance: The 3:1 Rule and Its Critics," International Security, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Spring 1989), pp. 54-89.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Correspondence: Reassessing Net Assessment," International Security, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Spring 1989), pp. 128-144.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Numbers, Strategy, and the European Balance," International Security, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 174-185.
John J. Mearsheimer, "A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe," International Security, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Fall 1986), pp. 3 57. Reprinted in Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, eds., The Use of Force, 3rd ed. (New York: University Press of America, 1988), pp. 590-617; and Steven E. Miller and Stephen Van Evera, eds., Naval Strategy and National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 47-101.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Prospects for Conventional Deterrence in Europe," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 41, No. 7 (August 1985), pp. 158 162. Reprinted in Len Ackland and Steven McGuire, eds., Assessing the Nuclear Age (Chicago: Education Foundation for Nuclear Science, 1986), pp. 335-343.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in Europe," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Winter 1984/1985), pp. 19 46. Reprinted in Hylke Tromp, ed., War in Europe (Aldershot, Eng.: Avebury, 1989), pp. 71-100.
John J. Mearsheimer, "War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495-1975," Journal of Modern History, Vol. 56, No. 4 (December 1984), pp. 710-711. Review essay of Jack S. Levy, War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495-1975 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983).
John J. Mearsheimer, "The Military Reform Movement: A Critical Assessment," ORBIS, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Summer 1983), pp. 285-300.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe," International Security, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Summer 1982), pp. 3 39. Reprinted in Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, eds., The Use of Force, 3rd ed. (New York: University Press of America, 1988), pp. 442-463; and Steven E. Miller, ed., Conventional Forces and American Defense Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 121-157.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Maneuver, Mobile Defense and the NATO Central Front," International Security, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Winter 1981/1982), pp. 104 122. Reprinted in Steven E. Miller, ed., Conventional Forces and American Defense Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 231-249.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Correspondence" [regarding the "British Generals Talk"], International Security, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Winter 1981/82), pp. 227 229.
John J. Mearsheimer, "The British Generals Talk," International Security, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Summer 1981), pp. 165 184.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Rejoinder" in "Debate on Precision guided Munitions," Survival, Vol. XXII, No. 1 (January February 1980), pp. 20 22.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Precision guided Munitions and Conventional Deterrence," Survival, Vol. XXI, No. 2 (March April 1979), pp. 68 76.
Op-Ed Pieces:
John J. Mearsheimer, "The Rise of China Will Not Be Peaceful at All," The Australian, November 18, 2005.
John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "Keeping Saddam Hussein in a Box," New York Times, February 2, 2003.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Guns Won't Win the Afghan War," New York Times, November 4, 2001.
John J. Mearsheimer et al., "War with Iraq Is Not in America's National Interest," New York Times paid advertisement, September 26, 2002.
John J. Mearsheimer, "The Impossible Partition," New York Times, January 11, 2001.
John J. Mearsheimer, "India Needs The Bomb," New York Times, March 24, 2000.
John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera, "Redraw the Map, Stop the Killing," New York Times, April 19, 1999.
John J. Mearsheimer, "A Peace Agreement That's Bound To Fail," New York Times, October 19, 1998.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Here We Go Again," New York Times, May 17, 1998.
John J. Mearsheimer, "The Only Exit From Bosnia," New York Times, October 7, 1997.
John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera, "Hateful Neighbors," New York Times, September 24, 1996.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Shrink Bosnia to Save It," New York Times, March 31, 1993.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Will Iraq Fight or Fold Its Tent? Liberation in Less Than a Week," New York Times, February 8, 1991.
John J. Mearsheimer, "A War the U.S. Can Win - Decisively," Chicago Tribune, January 15, 1991.
Work Experience:
July 1981 July 1982, Executive Secretary, Strategy and Arms Control Seminar, Harvard University.
May 1978 August 1978, Internship at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), Washington, D.C.
June 1970 August 1975, Officer, U.S. Air Force.
June 1965 July 1966, Enlisted Man, U.S. Army.
Other:
Member, Advisory Committee, National Interest.
Member, Board of Advisors of Foreign Affairs.
Member, Editorial Board, International Security.
Member, Editorial Board, Security Studies.
Member, Editorial Board, International History Review, 1997-2000.
Member, Editorial Board, JFQ: Joint Forces Quarterly.
Member, Editorial Board, Journal of Transatlantic Studies.
Member, Editorial Board, Asian Security.
Member, Editorial Board, China Security.
Member, International Editorial Committee, International Relations.
Member, Council on Foreign Relations (New York).
Member, Chicago Council on Global Affairs.
Member, International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Member, Visiting Committee of MIT Political Science Department, 2004-2008.
Member, International Academic Advisory Board, BESA Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, Israel, 1993-2006.
Member, Board of Advisors, Center on Peace and Liberty, Independent Institute.
Consultant, RAND Corporation, 1985-1986.
Secretary-Treasurer, Inter University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, 1985-1987.
Senior Fellow, John M. Olin Center for Inquiry Into the Theory and Practice of Democracy, University of Chicago.
Testified before Senate Foreign Relations Committee on October 3, 1985. See U.S. Congress, SFRC, A NATO Strategy for the 1990's, Part 5, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., October 3, 1985.
Testified before Senate Armed Services Committee on October 20, 1987. See U.S. Congress, SASC, Alliance and Defense Capabilities in Europe, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., October 20, 1987. Also reprinted in John T. Rourke, Taking Sides: Clashing Views on Controversial Issues in World Politics, 2nd ed. (Guilford, Ct.: Dushkin, 1989), pp. 224-230.
Section Chairperson for "National Security Policy" for the 1987 American Political Science Association Convention.
Member, Chicago Study Group on U.S. National Interests after the Cold War (Sponsored by Council on Foreign Relations), 1996.
Member, James Madison Award Selection Committee, American Political Science Association, 1999.
Member, Helen Dwight Reid Award Selection Committee, American Political Science Association, 2006.
Co-chair (with John L. Gaddis) of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences' "Committee on History, the Social Sciences and International Security Affairs," 1987-1990.
Associate member of the London School of Economics’ "Cold War Studies Centre" (CWSC).
Member, Selection Committee for President of the University of Chicago, 2005-2006.
Updated: August 09, 2007
Monday, December 17, 2007
The Warsaw Uprising of 1944 — a heroic
The Warsaw Uprising of 1944 — a heroic and tragic 63-day struggle to liberate World War 2 Warsaw from Nazi/German occupation. Undertaken by the Home Army (Armia Krajowa, AK), the Polish resistance group, at the time Allied troops were breaking through the Normandy defenses and the Red Army was standing at the line of the Vistula River.
Warsaw could have been one of the first European capitals liberated; however, various military and political miscalculations, as well as global politics — played among Joseph Stalin, Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) — turned the dice against it.
This site is dedicated to all those who fought for their freedom in the Warsaw Uprising of 1944 as well as all those who, as civilians, perished in the effort.
TIMELINE
At the end of July of 1944, Poland is in its fifth year of German occupation. On the eastern front, German armies are in full retreat suffering from the Red Army's spring offensive which is approaching Warsaw's eastern suburbs. The liberation of Poland's capital seems to be within reach. [ map ]
General 'Bor' Komorowski, commander of the Polish Underground Home Army (Armia Krajowa, AK), sets the beginning of the uprising in Warsaw against the German occupying forces at 'W-hour'; 5:00 p.m. on August 1, 1944. The uprising is expected to last about a week and have the character of mopping up and disarming operation. The insurgents, however, are unaware that the Germans have decided to defend 'fortress' Warsaw and to counter-attack Red Army forces to the east of the city. [ declarations ].
Warsaw's insurgents an estimated 40,000 soldiers, including 4,000 women, have only enough weapons for 2,500 fighters. They are facing a 15,000-strong German garrison which will grow to a force of 30,000, armed with tanks, planes, and artillery.
Day-to-day events [ day-to-day ]. Eyewitness' reports [ radio dispatches ].
| AUG. 1-2 | AUG. 3-4 | AUG. 5-7 | AUG. 8-16 | AUG. 17-23 | AUG. 24-Sep. 2 | SEP. 3-10 |
| SEP. 11-23 | SEP. 24-30 | OCT. 1-5 | EPILOGUE |
AUGUST 1–2, 1944
Before 'W-Hour' (W for wybuch, outbreak in Polish), thousands of mobilized Home Army soldiers are moving into their planned concentration points. In several City Centre, Wola and Zoliborz locations, the fighting begins ahead of schedule.
Insurgents attack 180 German military installations and the town's key strategic positions. After bloody battles, their attacks upon the bridges, airports, train stations and main military and police installations are repelled.
However, significant areas of the city's left bank districts are captured including: the Prudential high-rise building, the main post office, and the state mint. Gas, electric, and water works are in Polish hands. The Warsaw Power Plant in the Riverside district will be restored to operation providing electrical power for hospitals, printing presses, weapon production facilities, and other services until September, 1944. Communication through the crucial west-east front supplying arteries is severed.
In Wola, insurgents capture a large Waffen-SS food and military uniforms warehouse. Many Polish units chose to wear these uniforms embellished with white and red armbands to represent the national colors. The first day of fighting killed 2,000 insurgents and 500 Germans. At nightfall, a network of street barricades is constructed, blocking the most of the city's arteries.
The first issue of Information Bulletin (Biuletyn Informacyjny) newspaper is published. Overall, over 130 different newspapers and periodicals are published in Warsaw during the Uprising. [ newspapers ]
The Soviet eastern front offensive stops within twelve miles of Praga, the suburb on Warsaw's right bank; it will not resume until September 11, 1944. The Soviet air force abandons the skies over Warsaw to the Luftwaffe.
top
AUGUST 3–4
Heinrich Himmler, head of SS and Gestapo, dispatches relief troops to Warsaw headed by SS Lt. Gen. Heinrich Reinefarth and consisting of SS and police units from Poznan, Dirlewanger penal brigade, Kaminski RONA brigade, Azerbaijan infantry battalion, and others. Units of Hermann Göering division are also arriving. [ rona ]
SS General Erich von dem Bach assumes command of all German forces suppressing the Uprising.
Himmler's gives the order to kill all of the city's inhabitants, not take prisoners, and level Warsaw as an example for the rest of Europe.
The first German aerial bombardment by Ju-87 Stuka which will bomb the city daily. The insurgents have no anti-aircraft weapons to defend the city from the attack.
The uprising in Praga fails because of the overwhelming size of the German forces and the end of the Soviet offensive. The remaining insurgents units return underground or crossing into insurgent-controlled areas inside the city.
In the liberated districts, civil administrative structures operating within the framework of the Polish Underground State start functioning. [ administration ]
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AUGUST 5–7
A major German offensive with fresh relief troops sent to open east-west thoroughfares begins with attacks on the Wola and Ohota districts.
German troops conduct mass executions of approximately 65,000 civilians in the captured districts. Poles, without regard for age or gender, are rounded up house by house and shot. More than 1, 360 patients and staff of Wola and St. Lazarus hospitals are murdered. The Special Group 'verbrennung-kommando' is collecting and burning the bodies. [ map ]
In Mokotow, female civilians are used as shields in front of tanks that are attacking insurgents' positions. This practice will continue throughout the Uprising. [ atrocities ]
The insurgent battalion Zoska, aided by two captured Panther tanks, liberates 350 Polish and European Jewish prisoners from the Goose Farm concentration camp. Many of the freed Jews join the insurgents. [ saving jews ]
Making a round-trip from Brindisi, Italy the first Allied nighttime airdrop of supplies by Halifax and Consolidated B24 Liberator planes reaches Warsaw. [ airlift ]
The siege of Brühl Palace, a government complex near Saxon Garden is lifted by German forces breaking through Wola district. The German Governor of Warsaw region Ludwig Fischer, and Warsaw garrison commander general Reiner Stahel leave the building escorted by tanks. With the fall of Wola, the Old Town quarter is cut off from the City Centre and surrounded.
In Warsaw's Pruszkow suburb, a Durchgangslager 121 selection camp is established. Before the end of 1944, 600,000 deported inhabitants of Warsaw will pass through.
In the liberated areas, Scout Postal Service starts distributing mail, newspapers, and messages even to the areas under German control. [ mail ]
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AUGUST 8–16
Home Army clandestine radio station 'Lightning' (Blyskawica) starts broadcasting at the frequency of 32.8 and 52.1 meters, followed on August 9 by a civilian Polish Radio at the frequency of 43.4 meters. Both stations will remain on the air until the end of the Uprising.
[ radio ]
The first communications links through sewers are opened between isolated districts of Mokotow and City Centre. They will serve as vital transportation and evacuation lines for the duration of the Uprising.
A German leaflet titled 'Ultimatum' and signed by a Supreme Commander is dropped from planes. It urges the Warsaw inhabitants to leave the city, promising accommodations, jobs, and medical care, while threatening 'consequences' to those who disobey the call. [ leaflets ]
The main German offensive against the Old Town starts with 8,000 soldiers; it will continue unabated until the quarter falls on September 2. The offensive's objective is to isolate insurgent defenses, push them away from a strategic area overlooking one of the city's bridges, and liquidate them.
The first of four Home Army newsreels produced during the Uprising is shown to insurgents and civilians in the Palladium theatre.
In City Centre, insurgents repel a major tank attack. Nine tanks and other armed vehicles are destroyed. Heavy fighting occurs around Gdansk train station in an attempt to link up insurgent forces in Zoliborz and Old Town. The attacks are repelled with the use of an armored train.
Germans shut down the water supply after taking over the city's water filtering station. Water rationing and well digging begins. By the end of September, the City Centre district has more than 90 functioning wells.
A German B-IV vehicle mine abandoned near an Old Town barricade is brought inside the Polish defensive positions. Its sudden and massive explosion kills over 300 insurgents and civilians.
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AUGUST 17–23
German forces introduce new types of weapons into Warsaw: Karl Morser heavy mortar, Wufrrehmen incendiary rockets, and Goliath, a remote-controlled vehicle mine. These weapons will play a crucial role in the German offensive: isolated areas are bombarded non-stop by planes, heavy artillery and rockets, then Goliaths and tanks are sent in, followed by the infantry. [ weapons ]
Von dem Bach issues a proposal to surrender, which is ignored. Additional German forces attack Old Town. Artillery and armored train are shelling the district. During heavy aerial bombing some buildings are completely destroyed; the Polish Bank is struck by 10 bombs.
Insurgents capture isolated German strongholds in the City Centre district. The strategic high-rise telephone exchange building 'PASTA', a significant number of weapons, and 115 German soldiers are captured.
A 750-strong insurgent group breaks into the city's northern Zoliborz district. Another group enters the city from the south. The cargo train station, the Church of Holly Cross, the Police Headquarters, and another telephone exchange building are taken. However, an attack upon the Warsaw University campus, launched with the help of two armored vehicles (one of them insurgent-made 'Kubus') fails. [ kubus ]
Two Home Army attempts to break the siege of Old Town by attacking the Gdansk train station defended by an armored train, fail.
A Ju-87 Stuka plane is shot down by a insurgent heavy machine gun crew which violates the official ban not shoot at planes in order to conserve ammunition.
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AUG. 24–SEP. 2
The battle for Old Town, which begin on August 14, continues until September 2. With heavy fighting and air bombardment, as often as every 30 minutes, the perimeter of Polish Old Town defenses is reduced to 10 square miles. The State Mint falls into German hands. The fighting becomes ruthless. Some buildings are repeatedly capture, lost , and recaptured; tanks fire at point-blank range.
Insurgents' attempt to break through the Old Town siege into the City Centre overnight fails. Only one group, disguised in Wehrmacht uniforms, marches in three soldier column through the German positions in Saxon Garden into City Centre.
With the Old Town military situation becoming critical, between September 1 and September 2, insurgents escape through sewers into City Centre and Zoliborz. [ sewers ]
Left behind are 7,000 gravely wounded soldiers and 30,000 civilians. Advancing Germans forces execute most of the wounded, old and disabled. Some wounded insurgents are burnt alive in field hospitals.
Polish casualties in Old Town are 30,000 civilian dead and 7,500 dead and wounded insurgents (77 percent), German casualties were 3,900 dead and wounded (54 percent).
After much delay, the governments of Great Britain and the United States grant Allied combatant rights to the Home Army. It was hoped to end the summary executions of Polish POWs by German troops [ combatant ]. The Soviet Union refuses to issue a similar statement.
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SEP. 3–10
After the fall of the Old Town, the brunt of the German attack centers on the Riverside district; its objective is to push the insurgents away from the Vistula River. Heavy artillery barrage and air bombardment concentrate on the Warsaw Power Plant—the insurgents' central stronghold. Its destruction cuts off the electricity for the City Centre. After four days of bloody fighting, the Riverside district falls; insurgents and civilians withdraw to City Centre.
Airplanes drop leaflets signed by General von dem Bach urging civilians to leave the city on September 9 and September 10. The Polish Red Cross opens negotiations with Germans regarding the evacuation of elderly, wounded and underage civilians. Several thousand civilians leave the city during a two-hour cease fire.
A German offensive concentrates on the northern section of the City Centre, which is shelled by a 600mm mortar every eight minutes, inflicting in heavy casualties. Bombing destroys the City Centre printing plant, interrupting the publishing of Information Bulletin and other newspapers. Civilians flee into City Centre south.
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SEP. 11–23
Between September 11 and September 14 Red Army resumes its offensive towards Warsaw. German and Soviet airplanes engage in dog fights over the city. Soviet artillery shells German positions in Praga, Saxon Garden and Okenche Airport.
With the fall of Praga to the Red Army on September 16, German forces evacuate to Warsaw proper and dynamite remaining Vistula bridges. The Red Army is relieved by Soviet-sponsored General Berling's Polish First Army.
Retreating from Praga, German front line troops augment Gen. von dem Bach's forces. To prevent the establishment of bridgeheads, the main German effort concentrates on shattering the resistance in Czerniakow and Zoliborz districts along the the river.
From September 14 to September 16, bloody fighting erupted in Zoliborz with General Hans Lallner 19th Panzer Division. Berling's troops cross the river between September 16-17 in an abortive attempt to link up with Zoliborz insurgents. Civilians are executed in Marymont, a quarter of the Zoliborz district. [ atrocities ]
09/15-09/23. For three consecutive nights, 1,600 soldiers from Berling's army cross the Vistula and join insurgents in the Czerniakow district. The attempted landing between September 17-18 in the Riverside district fails with most of the 1,050 soldiers killed or captured. Heavy fighting in Czerniakow continues until September 23. Some defenders evacuate across the river, others reach the City Centre. Germans execute all captured insurgents and take Berling's soldiers as POWs.
09/18. First and last massive American day-time, high altitude airdrop; insurgents recover 16 tons, or 20 percent of the cargo; the rest falls into German hands. [ airlift ]
Heavy bombardment of the City Centre by Karl Morser mortar on September 16 brings massive casualties, including 100 German POWs.
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SEP. 24–30
09/24–09/30. Mokotow offensive. Germans attack the suburb of Mokotow, which falls on September 27. Advancing Germans execute wounded soldiers and hospital personnel. The perimeter of the Polish defenses is reduced to several blocks. On September 26, 9,000 civilians leave Mokotow during two-hour cease fire.
Some Mokotow defenders evacuate through sewers to City Centre. About 150 of them exit into German-held territory and are executed.
09/27. Mokotow capitulates after General von dem Bach promises to observe the Geneva Conventions. For the first time during the Uprising, captured Home Army members are treated as POWs.
09/29. Massive attack against Zoliborz with a panzer division and overwhelming number of infantry. Despite insurgents' desperate and bloody fighting, their resistance is broken.
Zoliborz capitulates on September 30. Several dozens communist unit soldiers attempt to cross the Vistula River; only a few succeed. A small groups of Jewish fighters hide in the cellars. A fortnight later, they are whisked out of the city by Home Army paramedics.
On September 28 General von dem Bach offers capitulation and the negotiations begin.
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OCT. 1–5
On October 1, during a six-hour cease-fire, 8,000 civilians evacuate the City Centre.
General von dem Bach and emissaries of General 'Bor' Komorowski sign the capitulation declaration. All fighting in Warsaw ceases at 8:00 p.m. on October 2, 1944. The terms of the capitulation agreement guarantees Geneva Conventions treatment for insurgents. Only the Wehrmacht, not the SS or Soviet collaborators, are to handle Polish POWs. [ capitulation ]
Final issue of Information Bulletin is published, dated October 4. Last Lighting's radio transmission from Warsaw to London was recorded at 9:40 p.m. on October 4, 1944.
Insurgents prepare for the surrender by destroying weapons, discarding any German uniforms or helmets in their possession, securing the archives, and issuing Home Army IDs to communists units and forged IDs to Jewish fighters.
Fifteen thousand insurgents from all districts went into the captivity, 5,000 wounded are evacuated into different prison camps. Evacuation of wounded insurgents from the field hospitals lasts until the second half of October.
All civilians are forced to leave the city. Among them are some insurgents who decided not to
go to POW camps and a few designated by the Home Army to continue the struggle. Approximately 55,000 civilians will end up in the concentration camps as dangerous elements [ concentration camps ], and an additional 150,000 are transported into forced labor camps in Germany. [ uprising cost ]
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EPILOGUE
Massive and organized looting campaign of the city by Germans began. Delegations from German municipalities were allowed to enter the ruins and strip them of anything that had not already been taken by the Wehrmacht, SS, and Soviet and Ukrainian collaborators.
Postwar Polish assessments claim that 33,000 railway wagons filled with furniture, personal belongings and factory equipment left Warsaw.
After everything of value was carried away, entire blocks of abandoned houses were set on fire. Monuments and government buildings were blown up by special German troops known as Verbrennungs und Vernichtungskommando (burning and destruction detachments).
On January 17, 1945, the Red Army and General Berling's Polish First Army enter the deserted ruins of Warsaw.
Tribute Polish Soldiers In Iraq
Tribute Polish Soldiers In Iraq
American Polish British Soldiers in Iraq Irak
Lets pray for all
Wspomnienia z Iraku Memories from Iraq 6 zmiana (6 rotation)
DLA POLSKICH ZOLNIERZY POLEGLYCH W IRAKU
Polish Army at the Middle East
Poland and Polish people we only want good for your great IRAQ
Allah alim
Please take care of my brothers, Polish army soldiers, some of them come from my home city in Poland
Please contact all friends do not attack Polish People in Iraq.
I wish all people from the great country of IRAQ with 5 thousand years of history all the best!!
One more time.
We as the Polish People are only to help You.
Poland did not got any contract like others.
It was long time polish slogan “for your freedom and ours”
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